Proposals to tax deposits in Cyprus to fund bank bailouts have provoked a rash of articles pointing out that inflation (or more exactly, systematic currency debasement by government-controlled central banks) is essentially the same thing as a deposit tax. That's indisputably true.
But there's much else that is rotten in Cyprus, and in the EU, and in the USA, and perhaps wherever central banks operate under government control. We should not stop short of clearly identifying the main problem: deposit insurance and other coercive, anti-competitive meddling in the financial markets by governments. Without abolishing such progressive/fascist constructs, the perverse and destructive phenomenon of forcing the general public to subsidize and insure the risky investments of wealthy elites through deposit taxes, tax-funded bailouts and massive currency debasement will continue. The gulf between wealthy elites and the poor will continue to widen, the middle class will continue to shrink, and malinvestment will continue to destroy capital, until sustainable growth is no longer possible and systemic decline sets in.
There is a better system: free banking. In a voluntary market banking system, the principle of "depositor beware" would apply: those that chased higher interest rate on their deposits would suffer a greater risk of total loss, instead of forcing those who just want to keep their principle safe to subsidize the risky lending practices of others. Meanwhile, risk-averse savers might keep their savings "in their mattresses" or pay a non-fractional reserve bank for storage, ATM, checking and/or debit card services.
Crowd-lending sites like "lendingclub.com" provide a glimpse of how lending can work for micro-lenders in a voluntary market. Anyone wishing to generate interest on their savings can conveniently diversify their lending by contributing small amounts of capital to fund a portfolio of small loans made to members of the club. Earned interest rates are currently in the range of about 5-11%, depending on the investment grade of micro-loans invested in. Those chasing interest the old-fashioned way in a free system could just buy a CD at their non-fractional reserve bank, which the bank could lend for a term not exceeding that of the CD. The traditional bond market would remain available, and financial services would compete to make it more accessible and useful to small savers and investors.
In a free banking system, central banks would have no reason to exist, and if existing, would be prohibited from buying government, mortgage or other politically favored bonds with newly created money. Nor would governments be permitted or capable of bailing out industries while favoring their cronies over bondholders, as in the auto industry bailouts. Government deposit insurance would not exist. In a free system, fractional reserve banks would not be prohibited, but would have to compete with non-fractional reserve banks, loan aggregators, insurance companies and other financial service companies for deposits. Fractional reserve banking would likely be uncompetitive, in the long run, without the government protection it currently enjoys. It adds little or no value to a lender or micro-lender seeking interest on funds available to lend, merely playing the role of a middle man. It's more efficient for lenders to control their risks by purchasing a selected portfolio of bonds directly. In a free system, such lending would be quite easy and efficient to do even for very small lenders, as crowd funding technology has already demonstrated.
It's hard to see how society transitions to a totally free banking system without first experiencing a total economic collapse followed by severe depressions and massive human suffering. Perhaps such outcomes are inevitable. There may be just too many powerful interests invested in the status quo to permit gradual reforms leading to a freer, more stable banking system. More hopeful visionaries such as Ron Paul have suggested a constructive alternative: enable competitive currencies and more competition in diverse forms of banking -- more freedom to innovate in the financial system. Absent government prohibition, it's likely that alternatives such as Bitcoin, micro lending clubs, mutual aid societies, and many other forms of peaceful and voluntary cooperation in financial transactions would grow from the rich soil of freedom. Many of these free institutions would survive to carry humanity forward when the progressive/fascist social paradigm finally collapses or gradually falls out of favor. Or so one can hope.
If the idea of free banking system seems unworkable to you, you might pick up "The Case Against The Fed" by Murray Rothbard. It's an easy read and arguably still the best introduction to modern central banking out there. It can be read in a weekend, and might transform your thinking on central banking almost that quickly. "A History of Money and Banking in the United States," also by Rothbard, is an excellent follow on. Read them both!
Friday, March 22, 2013
Friday, January 18, 2013
Drone Law Scribble
Bob Wenzel over at EPJ provoked me to think about drone law a bit with this posting today: http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2013/01/will-personal-drones-require-further.html
Here are my edited comments on his post, as a sort of note to myself to expand on the topic a bit when I get the chance.
Airspace and oceans are areas where Lockean-Rothbardian homesteading theory, as useful as it is, does not provide very satisfactory answers to the balance of rights that should be afforded to carriages in transit over or under private property as opposed to the land holders below or above the carriage. Libertarians of the bleeding heart variety have some useful things to say about spaces that are not owned by anyone in particular, but it would require some research on my part to outline some of the prominent points of left-libertarian public space theory and relate them to the problem at hand.
Regarding flying drones, it seems to me that these should be permitted and legally protected (as property) from attack so long as not creating a nuisance, or posing an unreasonable risk of harm to any property owners below. Spying on private property may be, at least under some circumstances, a nuisance that deprives the owner of the enjoyment of privacy that owning an expanse of rock or soil might reasonably expected to provide, although the nuances of that need some hashing out. No distinction should be made between private or government drones.
Because the real estate property owner cannot determine, using present technology, whether or not a drone is spying on property below, real property owners should be permitted to bring down or otherwise disable any overflying drones owned by others, so long as they do not use an unreasonable amount of force in doing so. Such drones should be protected (i.e., subject to no more than the minimal necessary trespass on chattel required to protect the land holder's rights) and returned to the rightful owners if possible to do so, presuming that the drones are not evidence of a violent crime. What is "reasonable force" should depend on the circumstances and may change with time as drone-protection technology improves. The burden of risk for overflying another person's land should belong to the drone operator, not the land holder, based on the principle that the drone operator is the one who decides to overfly the property of another and the land holder has no say in the matter. One who intentionally and unilaterally initiates an unforced action should bear all the risks of doing so.
Here are my edited comments on his post, as a sort of note to myself to expand on the topic a bit when I get the chance.
Airspace and oceans are areas where Lockean-Rothbardian homesteading theory, as useful as it is, does not provide very satisfactory answers to the balance of rights that should be afforded to carriages in transit over or under private property as opposed to the land holders below or above the carriage. Libertarians of the bleeding heart variety have some useful things to say about spaces that are not owned by anyone in particular, but it would require some research on my part to outline some of the prominent points of left-libertarian public space theory and relate them to the problem at hand.
Regarding flying drones, it seems to me that these should be permitted and legally protected (as property) from attack so long as not creating a nuisance, or posing an unreasonable risk of harm to any property owners below. Spying on private property may be, at least under some circumstances, a nuisance that deprives the owner of the enjoyment of privacy that owning an expanse of rock or soil might reasonably expected to provide, although the nuances of that need some hashing out. No distinction should be made between private or government drones.
Because the real estate property owner cannot determine, using present technology, whether or not a drone is spying on property below, real property owners should be permitted to bring down or otherwise disable any overflying drones owned by others, so long as they do not use an unreasonable amount of force in doing so. Such drones should be protected (i.e., subject to no more than the minimal necessary trespass on chattel required to protect the land holder's rights) and returned to the rightful owners if possible to do so, presuming that the drones are not evidence of a violent crime. What is "reasonable force" should depend on the circumstances and may change with time as drone-protection technology improves. The burden of risk for overflying another person's land should belong to the drone operator, not the land holder, based on the principle that the drone operator is the one who decides to overfly the property of another and the land holder has no say in the matter. One who intentionally and unilaterally initiates an unforced action should bear all the risks of doing so.
Monday, January 7, 2013
Aaron Sandusky Sentenced
Aaron Sandusky was sentenced to 10 years (the mandatory minimum sentence for what he was convicted of) + 5 probation today, for having wronged no one. He is representing himself on appeal, and greatly in need of and deserving your support. If you believe than this is too harsh a sentence for operating a cannabis dispensary in accordance with state law, visit aaronsanduskylegalfund.com and donate what you can.
Also check out the-human-solution.org, and join if you agree with supporting the "P.O.W.s for a plant."
"Remember those who are in prison, as though in prison with them, and those who are mistreated." Hebrews 3:13. While this was written to admonish the early Christians to support those who were imprisoned for spreading their radical new faith, its moral force applies in any circumstance where those pursuing justice by breaking unjust laws are imprisoned. We who support the same just causes must not let our imprisoned fellows be forgotten.
The transcript of the sentencing hearing will be published. I'll be watching for that and post a link when I can.
I attended the hearing this morning. Sandusky's counsel (Roger Diamond) made various constitutional objections. Of necessity these were short on precedent, which says more about the immoral state of American constitutional jurisprudence than the merits of the moralities at play. The sole precedent relied on was "Loving v. Virginia" which invalidated state laws against interracial marriage; in that case, the defendants were given a suspended sentence of one year and essentially ordered to stay out of Virginia. Sadly, the US Supreme Court has already found, in "Gonzales v. Raich" that the Federal government can criminalize the growing of cannabis even for personal use. To me, that is morally akin to banning interracial marriage or requiring all Jews to wear a yellow star, proving that "the law" on this point is morally bankrupt and deserves no respect. Unfortunately, that plus mandatory minimum sentences also means that Aaron Sandusky will be spending the next ten years in a Federal "correctional" institute; violent felons routinely receive milder sentences. His best hope at this point may be a repeal of federal prohibition and a presidential pardon. There is a pardon petition started at:
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/pardon-aaron-sanduskycase-cr12-00548-pa-man-currently-prison-facing-10-yrs-life-growing-medical/vwLY3swZ?utm_source=wh.gov&utm_medium=shorturl&utm_campaign=shorturl
About 20,000 more signatures are needed by January 16th.
Judge Percy Anderson went on a bit about Sandusky's supposed refusal to "take responsibility" for breaking the law. Aaron Sandusky always conducted his medical cannabis operation openly and in compliance with state law, so he cannot have meant that Aaron sought to conceal his actions. Perhaps what the Judge really meant is that Sandusky demanded a trial and has shown no remorse, believing the Federal prohibition against cannabis would not be enforced. Perhaps to the Judge, losing at trial and refusing to bow down to the idol of "the law" are offenses deserving ten years in prison, never mind the virtue of the underlying actions of which the defendant stands accused. Judge Anderson also threw in the old saw about drugs being tied to violent gangs, which was not apropos in this case where no violence was even alleged and all the cannabis sold was grown by Aaron Sandusky. I would not expect the Judge to admit the truth -- that the very prohibition he defends is the cause of virtually all drug-related violence. He is acting, after all, as the representative of the prison-industrial state, looking out for the welfare of the legions of federal employees whose jobs and pensions depend on maintaining the prohibition in effect.
There were only about 25 supporters of Mr. Sandusky there; the courtroom could have held much more. Many of those in attendance (perhaps about half) had a personal connection to him. Many were former clients of his C3 collective, who were generally elderly people with sweet and gentle dispositions. Cases like these don't come around all that often, but there are a number of other people facing Federal prosecution and imprisonment for supplying cannabis in accordance with state law. In an area as populous as Southern California, where medical cannabis is widely supported, it was disappointing to see so few people without a personal connection to Aaron Sandusky attend the hearing. People going to prison for peacefully supplying cannabis need our support, even if it's just quietly attending a hearing. Remember!
Also check out the-human-solution.org, and join if you agree with supporting the "P.O.W.s for a plant."
"Remember those who are in prison, as though in prison with them, and those who are mistreated." Hebrews 3:13. While this was written to admonish the early Christians to support those who were imprisoned for spreading their radical new faith, its moral force applies in any circumstance where those pursuing justice by breaking unjust laws are imprisoned. We who support the same just causes must not let our imprisoned fellows be forgotten.
The transcript of the sentencing hearing will be published. I'll be watching for that and post a link when I can.
I attended the hearing this morning. Sandusky's counsel (Roger Diamond) made various constitutional objections. Of necessity these were short on precedent, which says more about the immoral state of American constitutional jurisprudence than the merits of the moralities at play. The sole precedent relied on was "Loving v. Virginia" which invalidated state laws against interracial marriage; in that case, the defendants were given a suspended sentence of one year and essentially ordered to stay out of Virginia. Sadly, the US Supreme Court has already found, in "Gonzales v. Raich" that the Federal government can criminalize the growing of cannabis even for personal use. To me, that is morally akin to banning interracial marriage or requiring all Jews to wear a yellow star, proving that "the law" on this point is morally bankrupt and deserves no respect. Unfortunately, that plus mandatory minimum sentences also means that Aaron Sandusky will be spending the next ten years in a Federal "correctional" institute; violent felons routinely receive milder sentences. His best hope at this point may be a repeal of federal prohibition and a presidential pardon. There is a pardon petition started at:
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/pardon-aaron-sanduskycase-cr12-00548-pa-man-currently-prison-facing-10-yrs-life-growing-medical/vwLY3swZ?utm_source=wh.gov&utm_medium=shorturl&utm_campaign=shorturl
About 20,000 more signatures are needed by January 16th.
Judge Percy Anderson went on a bit about Sandusky's supposed refusal to "take responsibility" for breaking the law. Aaron Sandusky always conducted his medical cannabis operation openly and in compliance with state law, so he cannot have meant that Aaron sought to conceal his actions. Perhaps what the Judge really meant is that Sandusky demanded a trial and has shown no remorse, believing the Federal prohibition against cannabis would not be enforced. Perhaps to the Judge, losing at trial and refusing to bow down to the idol of "the law" are offenses deserving ten years in prison, never mind the virtue of the underlying actions of which the defendant stands accused. Judge Anderson also threw in the old saw about drugs being tied to violent gangs, which was not apropos in this case where no violence was even alleged and all the cannabis sold was grown by Aaron Sandusky. I would not expect the Judge to admit the truth -- that the very prohibition he defends is the cause of virtually all drug-related violence. He is acting, after all, as the representative of the prison-industrial state, looking out for the welfare of the legions of federal employees whose jobs and pensions depend on maintaining the prohibition in effect.
There were only about 25 supporters of Mr. Sandusky there; the courtroom could have held much more. Many of those in attendance (perhaps about half) had a personal connection to him. Many were former clients of his C3 collective, who were generally elderly people with sweet and gentle dispositions. Cases like these don't come around all that often, but there are a number of other people facing Federal prosecution and imprisonment for supplying cannabis in accordance with state law. In an area as populous as Southern California, where medical cannabis is widely supported, it was disappointing to see so few people without a personal connection to Aaron Sandusky attend the hearing. People going to prison for peacefully supplying cannabis need our support, even if it's just quietly attending a hearing. Remember!
Monday, October 15, 2012
To Hell With Pubic (sic) Policy - No On Measure B
 | ||||
| DO WE REALLY WANT THE LA COUNTY DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH IN CHARGE OF OUR PUBIC POLICY? |
| (Actual text of proposed measure heading from yesonb website) |
Polls reportedly show LA County voters 63% in favor of Measure B, which is being sold to votes as a requirement for porn actors to wear condoms. That's not really what the measure is about. Sadly too many voters are being fooled, once again, to vote for increases in taxes and regulations in the guise of protecting some supposedly helpless group. As the measure itself notes, California regulations already require porn actors to wear condoms. So there is absolutely no need for the County to enact its own condom requirement, even if one believes such regulations are needed. In actuality, the main effect of Measure B would be to impose yet
another occupational licensing requirement and potentially unlimited
permit fees on anybody still foolish enough to produce porn flicks within L.A. County.
Here is the part that imposes an unlimited permit fee on film producers:
So the sky is the limit on what may be charged; enough to pay salaries, overhead, expenses, health insurance, pensions, vacations, and other benefits for an untold number of County employees to trundle around the County making sure all of the rapidly dwindling number of porn shoots in the County have completed the proper written plans, posted the required notices on the set, and are all wearing the proper County-mandated condoms. Are requirements for full-body condoms far behind?
Porn movies are not highly elaborate affairs and do not require the resources of a major studio to produce. It's easy enough to throw a few cameras in a truck and drive to a nearby County with less onerous regulations, if only to avoid the burden of obtaining an L.A. County public health permit. But that's not the only problem. In the highly competitive world of porn production, the condom requirement changes the quality of the finished products. Porn with condoms, shot in L.A. County, will be less desirable to most consumers of porn than porn sans condoms shot outside of the County. People consume porn as escapist fantasy, and the presence of condoms only serves as a reminder that the promiscuous, no-strings attached sex being depicted is not as free and wild as the viewer might wish to fantasize. One can deplore the escapist desires of porn consumers, but that is missing the point. Fully-permitted porn with condoms is likely to be a money-losing proposition, and the proponents of Measure B are indulging their own statist fantasies to think otherwise.
So the main economic effect of passing Measure B will be to drive most of what remains of the porn movie industry out of the County. Those who tolerate governmental interference in the free market might find this acceptable, if L.A. County were experiencing economic growth in other areas. Obviously the County is generally speaking in the doldrums with no real relief in sight, and the effect of passing the Measure will be to further depress the local economy while swelling the County bureaucracy, even if only a little.
Another economic effect will be to discourage smaller producers from producing these sorts of films. In general, regulatory burdens are regressive because they fall most heavily on smaller and less well-financed business. Big businesses typically influence and support added regulatory burdens, because such burdens reduce competition and cement the dominance of the established players, as well as discourage innovation. So if you are an anti-big business sort, you should not be comfortable voting for this measure.
Another economic effect will be to discourage smaller producers from producing these sorts of films. In general, regulatory burdens are regressive because they fall most heavily on smaller and less well-financed business. Big businesses typically influence and support added regulatory burdens, because such burdens reduce competition and cement the dominance of the established players, as well as discourage innovation. So if you are an anti-big business sort, you should not be comfortable voting for this measure.
Economic issues aside, there is also the matter of individual freedom. Porn actors are adults engaging in consensual sex. Their motivation may be unusual, in that most people do not engage in sex professionally and are not comfortable in making a public performance out of their sexual escapades. But the motivations of the actors are personal to them and do not alter the essential character of the act. So if the County or state can regulate sexual intercourse between consenting adults who happen to be filming their activity, what sexual behavior will it seek to regulate next? Could the county regulate the wearing of condoms in other circumstances? Because the vast majority of sexually transmitted disease is NOT spread by actors working in porn production, it would seem that the imposition of condom requirements in more general circumstances can't be far off. I say, keep the county out of our pubic policy. If you are going to vote, vote NO on Measure B.
Tuesday, September 25, 2012
Jake's Libertarian Voter's Guide To The 2012 California Propositions
There's a whole raft of propositions to vote against this November. None of these were written by libertarians or for libertarians, and most of them deserve a vigorous punch of the "no" chad -- don't leave those chads a-hangin'! Here's why, in numerical order:
Prop 30: Jerry Brown's Tax Increases. Raises sales taxes .25% (3.45% increase over existing rates) and income taxes on those earning more than $250,000 a year by about 10 to 33% over present rates, depending on the bracket. Obviously, this is a horrible idea that will only serve to make California less likely to attract any investment or economic growth, with no offsetting benefits for the taxpayer. Vote NO.
Prop 30: Two-Year Budget Cycle. This is sponsored by the tax-loving technocrats at "California Forward" who are in favor of abolishing the 2/3 super-majority requirement for the legislature to increase taxes. That's not in this bill, but these people can't be trusted. This is a bill by Sacramento bureaucrats for Sacramento bureaucrats. One, it would spare them the pain of dealing with state budgets on an annual basis by making budgeting a biennial process -- so, even less transparency, flexibility and accountability will attend the process. More importantly, it sets up additional administrative requirements for local budgeting, and an optional "Community Strategic Action Plan" system in the California constitution, by which local governments that kowtow most effectively to Sacramento can achieve additional funding from a newly established "Performance and Accountability Trust Fund" funded out of general revenue. This law just makes California governance more Byzantine and burdensome. It would increase administrative burdens at all levels of local government, and increase the power and influence of Sacramento at the local level. A resounding NO!
Prop 32: Ban on corporate and union contributions to state and local candidates. Hmm . . just look at the parties for and against this measure. Currently about $8 million has been raised in support, $37 million opposing, almost all of the opposition money from various public sector unions. This measure would bar any organization from extracting political donations from wages paid to the organizations members, without each member's individual consent. Unions hate it because it would decrease their power and influence in politics, but it would not prevent any union members from voluntarily deducting from their paychecks to contribute to their union's favored political causes. Don't believe the barrage of attack ads -- the only reason this won't reduce corporate political donations is because presently, ONLY unions are allowed to use mandatory dues for political contributions. This proposition would give union members more control over their paychecks, so what's not to like? A firm YES YES YES and say a prayer too. Divine intervention may be needed to overcome the disparity in funding to get this proposition passed.
Prop 33: Car insurance rates can be based on a person's history of insurance coverage ("persistency discounts"). This could be viewed as a pro-free market rule, because it would remove one of the restrictions placed on California insurers by Proposition 103 in 1988, that is, the prohibition against loyalty ("persistency") discounts. I don't know why insurers see this as important enough to put on the ballot a second time, after a similar measure (Prop. 17) lost narrowly in 2010. Obviously, the restriction has impaired insurers (or some insurers) profitability somehow. Sure, a gap in coverage correlates statistically to higher risk of an insurance claim being made, but why can't insurers compensate for that just by raising everybody's rates a little? On the other hand, there is no reason why insurance companies should not be allowed to set rates that reflect actuarial risks. Plus, the full text of the changes to the California Insurance Code is clear and concise, and without any apparent trapdoors that might reduce competition in the insurance markets. A reasonably confident YES on this one. But I will be very interested to hear Ted Brown's thoughts on this one before punching the ballot.
Prop. 34: End The Death Penalty. This does a little more than its title says, but most of the curlicues seem acceptable, like requiring convicted murderers receiving life sentences to work, with money being paid into a victims' restitution fund. Sure, this is institutionalized slavery, but only for convicted murderers, and at least nominally for the benefit of victim's families. There is some justice in that. "Give me liberty or give me death" is a fine slogan for violent revolutionaries and passionate martyrs, but in reality, state-sanctioned slavery conditioned on a murder conviction by a unanimous jury seems less offensive than state-sanctioned murder under the same conditions. On the negative side, the proposition includes a gratuitous $100 million slush fund to the police state "to help solve more homicide and rape cases." Forgive me if I am skeptical. Why does a bill to eliminate the death penalty need to be accompanied by spending increases? Isn't the California government in a budget crisis? Nobody is getting executed in California anyway, so I am surprising myself by considering voting NO as a protest against the increased spending. Still, I am leaning towards YES as it is long past time to strip California of the merely theatrical power to deliberately and sanctimoniously, with painstaking forethought, murder its citizens. On balance, YES.
Prop. 35: Prohibition on Human Trafficking and Sex Slavery. Funny thing, human trafficking and sex slavery is already criminally illegal, so why do we need this proposition? Norma Jean Almodovar and Starchild are among the very few opposed, so it might be reasonable for a libertarian to base one's opposition on the title alone plus the wisdom of Norma Jean and Starchild as against the madness of the herd. The arguments in favor simply cite an unverified litany of horrors supposedly from "sex trafficking," none of which I have ever encountered or heard of from personal experience during a relatively long and unsheltered life in California. On its face the proposition seems suspiciously like a power grab against anyone in any way involved with the sex trade, which has become a significant free-market activity in the state. The vast majority of participants, however, are consenting adults. Most of the actual text of the law seems more narrowly focused. The most worrisome change may be in the definition of human trafficking: "Any person who deprives or violates the personal liberty of another with the intent to obtain forced labor or services, is guilty of human trafficking." This is a new and much broader definition than formerly applied. What does it mean to "violate the personal liberty of another" and what is "forced labor or services"? Would any "violation of personal liberty" in connection with the providing of some service cause the person receiving the service to become a human trafficker? For example, suppose an employer requires employees to report to work promptly at a certain time and remain on the job for certain hours, or else be fired, even though an employee protests. Does that not involve a "violation of personal liberty"? What about being required to wear a silly uniform? Etc., etc. The point is, the statute could be construed to make any employer or purchaser of services a human trafficker. On the flip side, the rest of the law seems fairly narrowly focused, and could well be used against corrupt police who coerce prostitutes into sex acts in exchange for leniency. However, the broad and ambiguous new definition of "human trafficking" is reason enough to oppose it. Vote NO.
Prop. 36: Repeal of the "Three Strikes" Law. This will restore more discretion in sentencing by limiting the third strike to "serious and violent" offenses. The main arguments in favor are based on a supposed correlation to lower crime rates in California since the original three strikes law was passed. I'm sorry, even if locking up some people for 25 years for petty offenses has reduced crime in California (which is doubtful), that doesn't make it good social policy or morally correct. One could just as well justify locking up every other random person on the same basis. "Restore the Three Strikes law to the public's original understanding by requiring life sentences only when a defendant's current conviction is for a violent or serious crime" seems like a fair characterization of this proposition. Vote YES.
Prop. 37: Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Engineered Food. Perhaps the most controversial proposition on the ballot for libertarians. Many support it as a truth-in-advertising requirement. I've read the proposed statute and it does not seem that complex or onerous at first glance. But read it carefully. I will not be voting for it, because it forces retailers to label food a certain way, and creates yet another civil enforcement industry suing businesses in California for reasons that have nothing to do with any actual harm to consumers. Sure, there are already a host of labeling regulations on the books, and this would just be perhaps only another small requirement. But that does not create a principled excuse to lay another straw on the camel's back. Proponents of the requirement overlook the difficulty that many producers or sellers of food products, especially small ones, will encounter when importing food from jurisdictions that have no GMO labeling requirement. How are all the ethnic food groceries and non-chain eateries in California going to comply with this requirement? My guess is, not at all. Which will make them subject to civil enforcement wherein "the consumer bringing the action need not establish any specific damage from, or prove any reliance on, the alleged violation." Breathtaking. This will be the ADA all over again, only magnified, and no doubt raise costs for consumers, drive small business and variety in food choices away from California, and enrich plaintiff's attorneys at the expense of small businesses and consumers. A far better way to handle this issue is to simply allow producers to advertise their products as "GMO free" if they choose to do so. False advertisers would be subject to existing laws against false advertising, fraud, and unfair business practices. The free market would supply GMO-free labeled products to those consumers who demand them, without raising costs for consumers who don't really care. A firm and principled NO.
Prop. 38: Molly Munger's State Income Tax Increase. A proposition curiously sponsored by confirmed tax raiser for California state schools. Would increase income taxes even more than Jerry Brown's measure, and on a much broader base, and throw the newly taxed revenue all down the public education rat hole. That's the ticket! A reflexive NO vote, no analysis required.
Prop 39: Income Tax Increase for Multistate Businesses. If this passes, it will actually be known as the "California Clean Energy Job Act" the major feature of which is the creation of a $550,000,000 slush fund called the "Clean Energy Job Creation Fund." Obviously, this is merely another exercise in crony capitalism and government displacement of the free market. I was going to analyze the details of the tax law change to see if a principled argument could be made for or against it on the basis of the non-aggression principle. But spotting this prominent bit of pork at the top of the text just spared me the trouble of such a tedious exercise. Clearly, a NO.
Prop. 40: Referendum on the State Senate Redistricting Plan. From Ballotpedia: "A 'Yes' vote approves, and a 'No' vote rejects, new State Senate districts drawn by the Citizens Redistricting Commission. If the new districts are rejected, the State Senate district boundary lines will be adjusted by officials supervised by the California Supreme Court." There is no discernible liberty interest either way. Feel free to vote yes, no, or abstain on the slightest whim.
So what's the tally? Eleven propositions, six recommended NO votes, four recommended YES votes, and one DON'T CARE. That's more YES votes than I am accustomed to. Perhaps I'll have to give some of those more thought. I recommend www.ballotpedia.org as a place to start your own research, if you are so inclined.
Prop 30: Jerry Brown's Tax Increases. Raises sales taxes .25% (3.45% increase over existing rates) and income taxes on those earning more than $250,000 a year by about 10 to 33% over present rates, depending on the bracket. Obviously, this is a horrible idea that will only serve to make California less likely to attract any investment or economic growth, with no offsetting benefits for the taxpayer. Vote NO.
Prop 30: Two-Year Budget Cycle. This is sponsored by the tax-loving technocrats at "California Forward" who are in favor of abolishing the 2/3 super-majority requirement for the legislature to increase taxes. That's not in this bill, but these people can't be trusted. This is a bill by Sacramento bureaucrats for Sacramento bureaucrats. One, it would spare them the pain of dealing with state budgets on an annual basis by making budgeting a biennial process -- so, even less transparency, flexibility and accountability will attend the process. More importantly, it sets up additional administrative requirements for local budgeting, and an optional "Community Strategic Action Plan" system in the California constitution, by which local governments that kowtow most effectively to Sacramento can achieve additional funding from a newly established "Performance and Accountability Trust Fund" funded out of general revenue. This law just makes California governance more Byzantine and burdensome. It would increase administrative burdens at all levels of local government, and increase the power and influence of Sacramento at the local level. A resounding NO!
Prop 32: Ban on corporate and union contributions to state and local candidates. Hmm . . just look at the parties for and against this measure. Currently about $8 million has been raised in support, $37 million opposing, almost all of the opposition money from various public sector unions. This measure would bar any organization from extracting political donations from wages paid to the organizations members, without each member's individual consent. Unions hate it because it would decrease their power and influence in politics, but it would not prevent any union members from voluntarily deducting from their paychecks to contribute to their union's favored political causes. Don't believe the barrage of attack ads -- the only reason this won't reduce corporate political donations is because presently, ONLY unions are allowed to use mandatory dues for political contributions. This proposition would give union members more control over their paychecks, so what's not to like? A firm YES YES YES and say a prayer too. Divine intervention may be needed to overcome the disparity in funding to get this proposition passed.
Prop 33: Car insurance rates can be based on a person's history of insurance coverage ("persistency discounts"). This could be viewed as a pro-free market rule, because it would remove one of the restrictions placed on California insurers by Proposition 103 in 1988, that is, the prohibition against loyalty ("persistency") discounts. I don't know why insurers see this as important enough to put on the ballot a second time, after a similar measure (Prop. 17) lost narrowly in 2010. Obviously, the restriction has impaired insurers (or some insurers) profitability somehow. Sure, a gap in coverage correlates statistically to higher risk of an insurance claim being made, but why can't insurers compensate for that just by raising everybody's rates a little? On the other hand, there is no reason why insurance companies should not be allowed to set rates that reflect actuarial risks. Plus, the full text of the changes to the California Insurance Code is clear and concise, and without any apparent trapdoors that might reduce competition in the insurance markets. A reasonably confident YES on this one. But I will be very interested to hear Ted Brown's thoughts on this one before punching the ballot.
Prop. 34: End The Death Penalty. This does a little more than its title says, but most of the curlicues seem acceptable, like requiring convicted murderers receiving life sentences to work, with money being paid into a victims' restitution fund. Sure, this is institutionalized slavery, but only for convicted murderers, and at least nominally for the benefit of victim's families. There is some justice in that. "Give me liberty or give me death" is a fine slogan for violent revolutionaries and passionate martyrs, but in reality, state-sanctioned slavery conditioned on a murder conviction by a unanimous jury seems less offensive than state-sanctioned murder under the same conditions. On the negative side, the proposition includes a gratuitous $100 million slush fund to the police state "to help solve more homicide and rape cases." Forgive me if I am skeptical. Why does a bill to eliminate the death penalty need to be accompanied by spending increases? Isn't the California government in a budget crisis? Nobody is getting executed in California anyway, so I am surprising myself by considering voting NO as a protest against the increased spending. Still, I am leaning towards YES as it is long past time to strip California of the merely theatrical power to deliberately and sanctimoniously, with painstaking forethought, murder its citizens. On balance, YES.
Prop. 35: Prohibition on Human Trafficking and Sex Slavery. Funny thing, human trafficking and sex slavery is already criminally illegal, so why do we need this proposition? Norma Jean Almodovar and Starchild are among the very few opposed, so it might be reasonable for a libertarian to base one's opposition on the title alone plus the wisdom of Norma Jean and Starchild as against the madness of the herd. The arguments in favor simply cite an unverified litany of horrors supposedly from "sex trafficking," none of which I have ever encountered or heard of from personal experience during a relatively long and unsheltered life in California. On its face the proposition seems suspiciously like a power grab against anyone in any way involved with the sex trade, which has become a significant free-market activity in the state. The vast majority of participants, however, are consenting adults. Most of the actual text of the law seems more narrowly focused. The most worrisome change may be in the definition of human trafficking: "Any person who deprives or violates the personal liberty of another with the intent to obtain forced labor or services, is guilty of human trafficking." This is a new and much broader definition than formerly applied. What does it mean to "violate the personal liberty of another" and what is "forced labor or services"? Would any "violation of personal liberty" in connection with the providing of some service cause the person receiving the service to become a human trafficker? For example, suppose an employer requires employees to report to work promptly at a certain time and remain on the job for certain hours, or else be fired, even though an employee protests. Does that not involve a "violation of personal liberty"? What about being required to wear a silly uniform? Etc., etc. The point is, the statute could be construed to make any employer or purchaser of services a human trafficker. On the flip side, the rest of the law seems fairly narrowly focused, and could well be used against corrupt police who coerce prostitutes into sex acts in exchange for leniency. However, the broad and ambiguous new definition of "human trafficking" is reason enough to oppose it. Vote NO.
Prop. 36: Repeal of the "Three Strikes" Law. This will restore more discretion in sentencing by limiting the third strike to "serious and violent" offenses. The main arguments in favor are based on a supposed correlation to lower crime rates in California since the original three strikes law was passed. I'm sorry, even if locking up some people for 25 years for petty offenses has reduced crime in California (which is doubtful), that doesn't make it good social policy or morally correct. One could just as well justify locking up every other random person on the same basis. "Restore the Three Strikes law to the public's original understanding by requiring life sentences only when a defendant's current conviction is for a violent or serious crime" seems like a fair characterization of this proposition. Vote YES.
Prop. 37: Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Engineered Food. Perhaps the most controversial proposition on the ballot for libertarians. Many support it as a truth-in-advertising requirement. I've read the proposed statute and it does not seem that complex or onerous at first glance. But read it carefully. I will not be voting for it, because it forces retailers to label food a certain way, and creates yet another civil enforcement industry suing businesses in California for reasons that have nothing to do with any actual harm to consumers. Sure, there are already a host of labeling regulations on the books, and this would just be perhaps only another small requirement. But that does not create a principled excuse to lay another straw on the camel's back. Proponents of the requirement overlook the difficulty that many producers or sellers of food products, especially small ones, will encounter when importing food from jurisdictions that have no GMO labeling requirement. How are all the ethnic food groceries and non-chain eateries in California going to comply with this requirement? My guess is, not at all. Which will make them subject to civil enforcement wherein "the consumer bringing the action need not establish any specific damage from, or prove any reliance on, the alleged violation." Breathtaking. This will be the ADA all over again, only magnified, and no doubt raise costs for consumers, drive small business and variety in food choices away from California, and enrich plaintiff's attorneys at the expense of small businesses and consumers. A far better way to handle this issue is to simply allow producers to advertise their products as "GMO free" if they choose to do so. False advertisers would be subject to existing laws against false advertising, fraud, and unfair business practices. The free market would supply GMO-free labeled products to those consumers who demand them, without raising costs for consumers who don't really care. A firm and principled NO.
Prop. 38: Molly Munger's State Income Tax Increase. A proposition curiously sponsored by confirmed tax raiser for California state schools. Would increase income taxes even more than Jerry Brown's measure, and on a much broader base, and throw the newly taxed revenue all down the public education rat hole. That's the ticket! A reflexive NO vote, no analysis required.
Prop 39: Income Tax Increase for Multistate Businesses. If this passes, it will actually be known as the "California Clean Energy Job Act" the major feature of which is the creation of a $550,000,000 slush fund called the "Clean Energy Job Creation Fund." Obviously, this is merely another exercise in crony capitalism and government displacement of the free market. I was going to analyze the details of the tax law change to see if a principled argument could be made for or against it on the basis of the non-aggression principle. But spotting this prominent bit of pork at the top of the text just spared me the trouble of such a tedious exercise. Clearly, a NO.
Prop. 40: Referendum on the State Senate Redistricting Plan. From Ballotpedia: "A 'Yes' vote approves, and a 'No' vote rejects, new State Senate districts drawn by the Citizens Redistricting Commission. If the new districts are rejected, the State Senate district boundary lines will be adjusted by officials supervised by the California Supreme Court." There is no discernible liberty interest either way. Feel free to vote yes, no, or abstain on the slightest whim.
So what's the tally? Eleven propositions, six recommended NO votes, four recommended YES votes, and one DON'T CARE. That's more YES votes than I am accustomed to. Perhaps I'll have to give some of those more thought. I recommend www.ballotpedia.org as a place to start your own research, if you are so inclined.
Wednesday, August 29, 2012
Why I Blog
An element of vanity,
A smattering of mirth,
A stab at sifting sanity,
An accident of birth.
Like a lemming I join
that theater of voice;
Just hoping to coin
a phrasing of choice.
Expressing the contemporary,
Uncovering the obscure;
For dialogue giving sanctuary,
Or just blithering in pure.
Such are the reasons I blog;
If it seem not enough,
To endure such a slog,
Please don't leave in a huff.
Don't follow the herd;
Perhaps you may parse
In the blogging of a nerd
Profundity strolling with farce.
A smattering of mirth,
A stab at sifting sanity,
An accident of birth.
Like a lemming I join
that theater of voice;
Just hoping to coin
a phrasing of choice.
Expressing the contemporary,
Uncovering the obscure;
For dialogue giving sanctuary,
Or just blithering in pure.
Such are the reasons I blog;
If it seem not enough,
To endure such a slog,
Please don't leave in a huff.
Don't follow the herd;
Perhaps you may parse
In the blogging of a nerd
Profundity strolling with farce.
Tuesday, July 24, 2012
My Thoughts on GMOs
The Libertarian Party does not take an official position on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), but perhaps it should. There are movements afoot to regulate and control the use of GMOs through top-down regulation imposed by the violent power of the state. Such an approach is not likely to end well. There are other ways to address the risks and moral issues posed by GMOs, through a bottom-up approach founded in natural rights, voluntary cooperation, and the rule of law. It is worth thinking about what a voluntarist approach to regulation of GMOs might look like, or what regulation, if any, is really necessary.
For the purposes of this article, a GMO is defined as an organism resulting from the artificial insertion of a genetic material into the organism's genome. "Artificial" means using gene splicing or a similar technique to achieve a result that cannot be obtained through selective breeding. For example, a mule obtained by mating a horse to a donkey is not a GMO, but a goat that has had a gene for producing spider silk inserted into her DNA using a laboratory technique is a GMO.
Although judicious uses of GMOs can produce amazing and desirable benefits, such uses may pose tangible risks of harm to persons, property, and the environment. The creation of GMOs may also implicate moral questions for some people. GMOs therefore pose both easy questions and hard questions for libertarians. The easy questions concern assigning responsibility for harms caused by GMOs to the persons responsible for causing those harms, though civil liability. The hard and perhaps irresolvable questions concern morality.
First, the easy questions, concerning regulation of GMOs in the marketplace. GMOs may be divided into two streams of commerce: products made from GMOs, and the GMOs themselves. Flour made from genetically modified wheat, spider silk from a genetically modified goat, or corn syrup from genetically modified corn are examples of products whose qualities may be affected by having been derived from a genetically modified source, but that do not pose any special risk to the environment such as genetic contamination of non-GMOs. There should be little debate among libertarians that a free-market approach to GMO products is the best approach. Simply put, individuals should be free to purchase or refuse to purchase GMO products as they deem best. This means that sellers passing off GMO products as coming from non-GMO sources, or vice-versa, must be held liable for fraud. Specific product labeling is not necessary, and should neither be required nor forbidden. If a seller declines, for whatever reason, to disclose whether or not a product is from a GMO source, that should be permitted. Individuals who want to avoid consuming any GMO products can do so by purchasing only from sellers who are willing to warranty that their products come from non-GMO sources. The free market will quickly drive out unsafe or unduly risky GMO products, while allowing for development of safe and effective GMO products for applications where non-GMO products are not available, more expensive, or of inferior quality.
Commerce in living GMOs is a more difficult area, that may be approached by dividing GMOs into classes based on level of risk to humans and the environment. At the highest level of risk are living GMOs that pose a direct risk to human life or health, such as weaponized pathogens. These organisms pose an uncontrollable risk of serious harm. There is no conceivable justification for the creation of new deadly and uncontrollable organisms under libertarian principles. Such activity creates unreasonable risks for others without any offsetting benefits, tantamount to an unprovoked act of aggression. Therefore, the creation of such GMOs whether by government or private entities should generally be regarded as a crime. It may be morally defensible to experiment with GMOs for the purpose of creating vaccines or antidotes to known biological weapons held by an enemy. This justification fails when the organism is entirely new and therefore not known to be possessed by an enemy, as in the case of a GMO. A voluntarist society could enter into treaties with its neighbors banning any development or use of biological weapons, just as statist societies do.
At the lowest levels of risk are GMOs that are incapable of reproducing or exchanging any genetic material with non-GMOs. Such organisms pose no discernible environmental risk, because in the event these GMOs escape into the environment, they will simply die out without causing any long-term effects. Of course, an escaped GMO could cause harm just as an escaped non-GMO can, and owners of GMOs should be held responsible for any harm or damages caused by their escaped organisms just as owners of non-GMOs are. These types of low-risk GMO's should not require any special consideration insofar as civil liability goes. Their creation may implicate moral questions, which are touched on later.
At intermediate levels of risks are GMOs that do not pose any severe risk to human life or health, but that are capable of reproducing or interbreeding with non-GMO organisms, and may have some harmful environmental effects. The damages caused by such organisms, once escaped into the environment, may far exceed the ability of any entity to compensate for or repair. On the other hand, actual damages caused by escapes into the environment may sometimes or even usually be quite manageable or immaterial. The key point that should be recognized is that the possibility of indefinite and widespread replication of genetic material from GMOs calls for a different analysis than classical liberal views of environmental pollution as advanced by Rothbard, Coase, and others. Self-replicating GMOs represent a Pandora's box of unknown risks that may spread far beyond an area of initial introduction.
This aspect of GMO's does not mean that the state should control introduction of GMOs, picking winners and losers to achieve its political ends. It just means recognizing that potential harm caused by introduction of a GMO may extend indefinitely far beyond the adjacent property owners, in both space and time. Therefore, a bottom-up regulatory scheme may operate by recognizing a right of non-adjacent stake holders to know about and oppose the introduction of a particular GMO prior to its introduction into the environment. For example, it may be made a crime to introduce a GMO into the environment without prior public notice and opportunity to oppose. If opposition is filed, the GMO-introducing party may be assigned the burden of proof (after a burden of production is satisfied by an opposing party) to show one of the following circumstances applies: (a) the GMO cannot reproduce or exchange genetic material with non-GMOs; (b) the introducing party is capable of and will prevent release of the GMO into the environment through some reliable technological means; or (c) release of the GMO into the environment will not cause any harm that cannot be repaired or compensated for by the introducer. Unless the introducer could prove that one of the foregoing circumstances applies in a particular case, any introduction of the GMO at issue would remain subject to criminal as well as civil liability.
A body of law and civil procedure would have to be developed to address these highly fact-based questions, the details of which would exceed the scope of this article. Such an adversarial private law approach to sifting the risks and benefits of GMOs would prove far superior to essentially arbitrary regulation by the state. A private negotiating process under the rule of law would drive out projects wherein the risks of a particular GMO cannot be shown to be manageable. Meanwhile, the most economically worthy projects, wherein the GMO is of sufficient value to justify the costs of the adversarial approval process plus subsequent risk mitigation and insurance costs in addition to development costs, would enjoy a much higher probability of passing the opposition process. Introducers of GMOs would remain liable for any actual damages caused by introduction of GMOs into the environment, regardless of whether or not criminal liability also applies.
There are some worthy counterarguments to use of a proactive private opposition procedure to regulate the introduction of GMOs. For one, a too stringent opposition procedure would merely shift research and use of GMOs to jurisdictions with laxer regulations. Thus the opening of the GMO Pandora's box cannot be prevented; and if it cannot be prevented anyway, why bother with proactive regulation at all? A further objection is that a proactive opposition procedure unfairly singles out one type of activity; after all, any activity may cause damages beyond the ability of the economic actor to repay or repair. These arguments may appeal to the purist advocate of the free market, but will do nothing to allay the concerns of many who fear untrammeled use of GMO technology. A private opposition procedure is admittedly a compromise position roughly midway between total state control of GMO activity and no prior restraints at all. For a potential Pandora's box type of technology, some mechanism for prior restraint may be politically unavoidable and prudent for practical reasons, unless and until the technology is shown not to pose a risk of irreparable environmental harm. Until then, mitigation of such Pandora's risks should as much as possible be privately negotiated directly between stakeholders each acting in their own respective economic self-interest.
Statists will meanwhile argue that nothing short of total state control of GMO activity will do. The FDA stands as Exhibit A for why this will not work. Leaving aside the strongly held beliefs of libertarians that government control of the pharmaceutical markets violates natural rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and is economically unnecessary besides, the FDA has not proven effective as a regulator of medicines. It is too beholden to the large pharmaceutical interests and too eager to stamp out cost-effective alternatives such as nutritional therapies. Lacking any competition in the United States, it imposes overly burdensome requirements on new remedies and stifles innovation in health care. Instead of acting in the public interest, it acts in its own self-interest by seeking to expand its own importance and budget, rewarding political cronies and punishing political enemies along the way. Government control of GMOs would have a similar deleterious and distorting effect, and interfere with the economic process of encouraging development of the most valuable applications for GMOs while preventing the riskiest.
Regarding moral questions, some may believe that the creation of GMOs is an offense to God or Nature, a violation of the rights of animals, or a violation of human rights, and should be banned entirely or subject to tight control by the state as an enforcer of morals. Others believe that all forms of genetic manipulation should be permissible and are even inevitable, perhaps excepting the development of biological weapons. Naturally, a libertarian political philosophy should not advocate for the state as the decider or enforcer of such moral questions, to the extent no forcible harm or fraud is involved. Some may also believe that any use of GMOs is inherently too risky to be permissible under any circumstances, but such abject fear is logically unsound. All economic activity or inactivity entails risks and consequences, which can be better understood by unbiased and reasoned examination.
Perhaps the most difficult moral issues involve modification of the human genome. Because the individual whose genome is modified cannot know about or give consent to the modification (assuming that the modification is performed on a zygote before the individual is formed), some may view this as an impermissible use of force against the individual. Others may believe it permissible so long as the decision is made by the parent (or parents) or legal guardian, perhaps in limited circumstances such as to eliminate known genetic defects. The ethics of human genetic manipulation are certainly worthy of thoughtful consideration. At the margins, the ethical issues may become extremely provocative. For example, is a creation of a clearly non-human chimera (human-animal genetic combination) a criminal act? What about modifying the genome of a zygote to make a person with fins and gills? However, unless and until radical modifications of the human genome prove possible, such questions, being merely hypothetical, are unlikely to be a great source of controversy among libertarians.
For the purposes of this article, a GMO is defined as an organism resulting from the artificial insertion of a genetic material into the organism's genome. "Artificial" means using gene splicing or a similar technique to achieve a result that cannot be obtained through selective breeding. For example, a mule obtained by mating a horse to a donkey is not a GMO, but a goat that has had a gene for producing spider silk inserted into her DNA using a laboratory technique is a GMO.
Although judicious uses of GMOs can produce amazing and desirable benefits, such uses may pose tangible risks of harm to persons, property, and the environment. The creation of GMOs may also implicate moral questions for some people. GMOs therefore pose both easy questions and hard questions for libertarians. The easy questions concern assigning responsibility for harms caused by GMOs to the persons responsible for causing those harms, though civil liability. The hard and perhaps irresolvable questions concern morality.
First, the easy questions, concerning regulation of GMOs in the marketplace. GMOs may be divided into two streams of commerce: products made from GMOs, and the GMOs themselves. Flour made from genetically modified wheat, spider silk from a genetically modified goat, or corn syrup from genetically modified corn are examples of products whose qualities may be affected by having been derived from a genetically modified source, but that do not pose any special risk to the environment such as genetic contamination of non-GMOs. There should be little debate among libertarians that a free-market approach to GMO products is the best approach. Simply put, individuals should be free to purchase or refuse to purchase GMO products as they deem best. This means that sellers passing off GMO products as coming from non-GMO sources, or vice-versa, must be held liable for fraud. Specific product labeling is not necessary, and should neither be required nor forbidden. If a seller declines, for whatever reason, to disclose whether or not a product is from a GMO source, that should be permitted. Individuals who want to avoid consuming any GMO products can do so by purchasing only from sellers who are willing to warranty that their products come from non-GMO sources. The free market will quickly drive out unsafe or unduly risky GMO products, while allowing for development of safe and effective GMO products for applications where non-GMO products are not available, more expensive, or of inferior quality.
Commerce in living GMOs is a more difficult area, that may be approached by dividing GMOs into classes based on level of risk to humans and the environment. At the highest level of risk are living GMOs that pose a direct risk to human life or health, such as weaponized pathogens. These organisms pose an uncontrollable risk of serious harm. There is no conceivable justification for the creation of new deadly and uncontrollable organisms under libertarian principles. Such activity creates unreasonable risks for others without any offsetting benefits, tantamount to an unprovoked act of aggression. Therefore, the creation of such GMOs whether by government or private entities should generally be regarded as a crime. It may be morally defensible to experiment with GMOs for the purpose of creating vaccines or antidotes to known biological weapons held by an enemy. This justification fails when the organism is entirely new and therefore not known to be possessed by an enemy, as in the case of a GMO. A voluntarist society could enter into treaties with its neighbors banning any development or use of biological weapons, just as statist societies do.
At the lowest levels of risk are GMOs that are incapable of reproducing or exchanging any genetic material with non-GMOs. Such organisms pose no discernible environmental risk, because in the event these GMOs escape into the environment, they will simply die out without causing any long-term effects. Of course, an escaped GMO could cause harm just as an escaped non-GMO can, and owners of GMOs should be held responsible for any harm or damages caused by their escaped organisms just as owners of non-GMOs are. These types of low-risk GMO's should not require any special consideration insofar as civil liability goes. Their creation may implicate moral questions, which are touched on later.
At intermediate levels of risks are GMOs that do not pose any severe risk to human life or health, but that are capable of reproducing or interbreeding with non-GMO organisms, and may have some harmful environmental effects. The damages caused by such organisms, once escaped into the environment, may far exceed the ability of any entity to compensate for or repair. On the other hand, actual damages caused by escapes into the environment may sometimes or even usually be quite manageable or immaterial. The key point that should be recognized is that the possibility of indefinite and widespread replication of genetic material from GMOs calls for a different analysis than classical liberal views of environmental pollution as advanced by Rothbard, Coase, and others. Self-replicating GMOs represent a Pandora's box of unknown risks that may spread far beyond an area of initial introduction.
This aspect of GMO's does not mean that the state should control introduction of GMOs, picking winners and losers to achieve its political ends. It just means recognizing that potential harm caused by introduction of a GMO may extend indefinitely far beyond the adjacent property owners, in both space and time. Therefore, a bottom-up regulatory scheme may operate by recognizing a right of non-adjacent stake holders to know about and oppose the introduction of a particular GMO prior to its introduction into the environment. For example, it may be made a crime to introduce a GMO into the environment without prior public notice and opportunity to oppose. If opposition is filed, the GMO-introducing party may be assigned the burden of proof (after a burden of production is satisfied by an opposing party) to show one of the following circumstances applies: (a) the GMO cannot reproduce or exchange genetic material with non-GMOs; (b) the introducing party is capable of and will prevent release of the GMO into the environment through some reliable technological means; or (c) release of the GMO into the environment will not cause any harm that cannot be repaired or compensated for by the introducer. Unless the introducer could prove that one of the foregoing circumstances applies in a particular case, any introduction of the GMO at issue would remain subject to criminal as well as civil liability.
A body of law and civil procedure would have to be developed to address these highly fact-based questions, the details of which would exceed the scope of this article. Such an adversarial private law approach to sifting the risks and benefits of GMOs would prove far superior to essentially arbitrary regulation by the state. A private negotiating process under the rule of law would drive out projects wherein the risks of a particular GMO cannot be shown to be manageable. Meanwhile, the most economically worthy projects, wherein the GMO is of sufficient value to justify the costs of the adversarial approval process plus subsequent risk mitigation and insurance costs in addition to development costs, would enjoy a much higher probability of passing the opposition process. Introducers of GMOs would remain liable for any actual damages caused by introduction of GMOs into the environment, regardless of whether or not criminal liability also applies.
There are some worthy counterarguments to use of a proactive private opposition procedure to regulate the introduction of GMOs. For one, a too stringent opposition procedure would merely shift research and use of GMOs to jurisdictions with laxer regulations. Thus the opening of the GMO Pandora's box cannot be prevented; and if it cannot be prevented anyway, why bother with proactive regulation at all? A further objection is that a proactive opposition procedure unfairly singles out one type of activity; after all, any activity may cause damages beyond the ability of the economic actor to repay or repair. These arguments may appeal to the purist advocate of the free market, but will do nothing to allay the concerns of many who fear untrammeled use of GMO technology. A private opposition procedure is admittedly a compromise position roughly midway between total state control of GMO activity and no prior restraints at all. For a potential Pandora's box type of technology, some mechanism for prior restraint may be politically unavoidable and prudent for practical reasons, unless and until the technology is shown not to pose a risk of irreparable environmental harm. Until then, mitigation of such Pandora's risks should as much as possible be privately negotiated directly between stakeholders each acting in their own respective economic self-interest.
Statists will meanwhile argue that nothing short of total state control of GMO activity will do. The FDA stands as Exhibit A for why this will not work. Leaving aside the strongly held beliefs of libertarians that government control of the pharmaceutical markets violates natural rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and is economically unnecessary besides, the FDA has not proven effective as a regulator of medicines. It is too beholden to the large pharmaceutical interests and too eager to stamp out cost-effective alternatives such as nutritional therapies. Lacking any competition in the United States, it imposes overly burdensome requirements on new remedies and stifles innovation in health care. Instead of acting in the public interest, it acts in its own self-interest by seeking to expand its own importance and budget, rewarding political cronies and punishing political enemies along the way. Government control of GMOs would have a similar deleterious and distorting effect, and interfere with the economic process of encouraging development of the most valuable applications for GMOs while preventing the riskiest.
Regarding moral questions, some may believe that the creation of GMOs is an offense to God or Nature, a violation of the rights of animals, or a violation of human rights, and should be banned entirely or subject to tight control by the state as an enforcer of morals. Others believe that all forms of genetic manipulation should be permissible and are even inevitable, perhaps excepting the development of biological weapons. Naturally, a libertarian political philosophy should not advocate for the state as the decider or enforcer of such moral questions, to the extent no forcible harm or fraud is involved. Some may also believe that any use of GMOs is inherently too risky to be permissible under any circumstances, but such abject fear is logically unsound. All economic activity or inactivity entails risks and consequences, which can be better understood by unbiased and reasoned examination.
Perhaps the most difficult moral issues involve modification of the human genome. Because the individual whose genome is modified cannot know about or give consent to the modification (assuming that the modification is performed on a zygote before the individual is formed), some may view this as an impermissible use of force against the individual. Others may believe it permissible so long as the decision is made by the parent (or parents) or legal guardian, perhaps in limited circumstances such as to eliminate known genetic defects. The ethics of human genetic manipulation are certainly worthy of thoughtful consideration. At the margins, the ethical issues may become extremely provocative. For example, is a creation of a clearly non-human chimera (human-animal genetic combination) a criminal act? What about modifying the genome of a zygote to make a person with fins and gills? However, unless and until radical modifications of the human genome prove possible, such questions, being merely hypothetical, are unlikely to be a great source of controversy among libertarians.
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