Once upon a time, aided by no more than the equivalent of a double expresso, obsessive-compulsive disorders, unbridled ambition, naivete, and hazy memories of "Economics in One Lesson," Jake endeavored to demystify Sacramento lawmaking for the entire first half of October, 2013. It proved too much. California in 2013 is a one-party state with no effective political opposition. So, laws are passed at a dizzying pace, with only the judgement of an experienced but very socialist politician (Jerry Brown) to restrain the flood. A part-time blogger cannot keep up with the resulting volume of legislative vomit spewing forth from Sacramento. It is doubtful whether the job will ever be finished, so a progress report is being posted now. If there is enough interest it can always be updated with more reviews later, but Jake needs to move on to other things now.
SCORE as of this posting: 26 "Loses," 11 "Newses," 14 "Snoozes," and 299 unreviewed. More than one fifth (11) of the actions reviewed were rated as "news"; most of these were vetoes of horribly bad bills. This is surprisingly high. Nonetheless, the net score so far is -15 out of 51 acts reviewed. Rather dismal for liberty, but could be worse. (That phrase pretty much sums up the state of affairs in California now, doesn't it?)
His methodology: Jake briefly reviewed each bill signed or vetoed by Governor Brown, and prepared a summary no longer than two sentences. He then scored the act of signing or vetoing, as the case may be, as a "lose," "snooze," or "news," in some cases providing a brief justification for the assigned score.
"Lose" means that, on the whole, the action is deemed destructive to personal or economic freedom. "Snooze" means the action is, on the whole, deemed of negligible effect on anyone's freedoms. "News" means that, surprise, surprise, something has happened in Sacramento that has a decent chance of increasing some sort of freedom, somewhere; or in the case of a veto, the governor has vetoed a liberty-limiting measure. "Deemed" means in Jake's sole, lightly informed and possibly mistaken opinion. Critical feedback is welcome. Finally, a numeric score of -1, 0, or +1 was assigned based on the scores (+1 for "news," you figure out the rest), and a cumulative numeric score for the sample Jake managed to finish tallied up.
10-13-2013
SACRAMENTO – Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. today announced that he has signed the following bills.
• AB 128 by Assemblymember Steven Bradford (D-Gardena) – Peace officers: airport law enforcement.
• AB 494 by Assemblymember V. Manuel Pérez (D-Coachella) – Prisoners: literacy and education.
• AB 537 by Assemblymember Rob Bonta (D-Alameda) – Meyers-Milias-Brown Act: impasse procedures.
• AB 607 by Assemblymember Henry T. Perea (D-Fresno) – Workers' compensation: dependent children.
• AB 651 by Assemblymember Steven Bradford (D-Gardena) – Convictions: expungement.
• AB 986 by Assemblymember Steven Bradford (D-Gardena) – Postrelease community supervision: flash incarceration: city jails.
• AB 1019 by Assemblymember Tom Ammiano (D-San Francisco) – State prisons: correctional, educational and vocational training.
• AB 1217 by Assemblymember Bonnie Lowenthal (D-Long Beach) – Home Care Services Consumer Protection Act. A signing message can be found here.
• AB 1325 by Assemblymember John A. Pérez (D-Los Angeles) – Vandalism: punishment.
• AB 1336 by Assemblymember Jim L. Frazier (D-Oakley) – Prevailing wages: payroll records.
• AB 1376 by Assemblymember Roger Hernández (D-West Covina) – Workers' compensation: medical treatment: interpreters.
• SB 7 by Senator Darrell Steinberg (D-Sacramento) – Public works: charter cities.
• SB 54 by Senator Loni Hancock (D-Berkeley) – Hazardous materials management: stationary sources: skilled and trained workforce. A signing message can be found here.
• SB 341 by Senator Mark DeSaulnier (D-Concord) – Redevelopment.
• SB 458 by Senator Roderick D. Wright (D-Los Angeles) – Gangs: statewide database.
• SB 513 by Senator Loni Hancock (D-Berkeley) – Diversion programs: sealed records.
• SB 569 by Senator Ted W. Lieu (D-Torrance) – Interrogation: electronic recordation.
• SB 618 by Senator Mark Leno (D-San Francisco) – Wrongful convictions.
Governor Brown also announced that he has vetoed the following bills.
• AB 302 by Assemblymember Ed Chau (D-Monterey Park) – Public works: public subsidies. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 454 by Assemblymember Roger Dickinson (D-Sacramento) – Workers' compensation benefits: prevailing wages. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 564 by Assemblymember Kevin Mullin (D-South San Francisco) – Community redevelopment: successor agencies. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 566 by Assemblymember Bob Wieckowski (D-Fremont) – Courts: personal services contracting. A veto message can be found here. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 662 by Assemblymember Toni G. Atkins (D-San Diego) – Local government: redevelopment: successor agencies to redevelopment agencies. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 855 by Assemblymember Cheryl Brown (D-San Bernardino) – State employees: Absence without leave: reinstatement. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 994 by Assemblymember Bonnie Lowenthal (D-Long Beach) – Postplea misdemeanor diversion programs. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 1113 by Assemblymember Jim L. Frazier (D-Oakley) – Provisional driver's licenses: restrictions. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 1140 by Assemblymember Tom F. Daly (D-Anaheim) – Public works: prevailing wages. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 1165 by Assemblymember Nancy Skinner (D-Berkeley) – Occupational safety and health: violations. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 1229 by Assemblymember Toni G. Atkins (D-San Diego) – Land use: zoning regulations. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 1263 by Assemblymember John A. Pérez (D-Los Angeles) – Medi-Cal: CommuniCal. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 1373 by Assemblymember John A. Pérez (D-Los Angeles) – Workers’ compensation: firefighters and peace officers. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 36 by Senator Ben Hueso (D-San Diego) – Internet Web site: workers' compensation insurers: workers' compensation data. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 258 by Senator Ted W. Lieu (D-Torrance) – Workers' compensation. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 448 by Senator Mark Leno (D-San Francisco) – Energy: petroleum supply and pricing. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 615 by Senator Cathleen Galgiani (D-Stockton) – Public works: prevailing wages. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 746 by Senator Mark Leno (D-San Francisco) – Health care coverage: premium rates. A veto message can be found here.
10-12-2013
SACRAMENTO – Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. today announced that he has signed the following bills.
• AB 16 by Assemblymember John A. Pérez (D-Los Angeles) – Domestic violence: corporal injury. Extends special criminal penalties for "corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition" for such inflicted on a finance, former finance, or anyone in a present or former dating relationship with the accused. More meddling by the state in personal relationships and grandstanding on "domestic violence", will probably result in enhanced sentences for more clueless schmucks and increased costs for imprisoning them. LOSE -1
• AB 68 by Assemblymember Brian Maienschein (R-San Diego) – Parole. Requires "the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to give notice of any medical parole hearing and any medical parole release to the county of commitment, and the county of proposed release, at least 30 days, or as soon as feasible, prior to a medical parole hearing or a medical parole release." Creates more delay, obstacles and opportunities for bureaucratic meddling in prisoner releases for medical reasons. LOSE -1
• AB 184 by Assemblymember Mike Gatto (D-Los Angeles) – Statute of limitations. Extends statute of limitations in hit-and-run cases involving serious injury or worse, for up to a year after the defendant is identified but not exceeding six years from the alleged crime. A very small part of pernicious trend of gradually increasing the statute of limitations for everything, for no good reason. LOSE -1
• AB 205 by Assemblymember Richard Pan (D-Sacramento) – Public employees' retirement: pension fund management. Allows county retirement investment boards "consistent with their fiduciary duties and the standard for prudent investment, to prioritize investment in an in-state infrastructure project over a comparable out-of-state infrastructure project;" certain state retirement boards already have this discretion. Rearranging the deck chairs. SNOOZE 0
• AB 325 by Assemblymember Luis Alejo (D-Salinas) – Land use and planning: cause of actions: time limitations. Somebody was upset about the court’s opinion in Urban Habitat Program v. City of Pleasanton (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1561, so they passed this bill to make it easier or harder for developers of affordable housing to challege local zoning and planning decisions. I can't tell which in 60 seconds and it would take too much research to figure this out, so I'll guess it's just another power squabble over bureacratic procedures. SNOOZE 0
• AB 373 by Assemblymember Kevin Mullin (D-South San Francisco) – Public Employees' Long-Term Care Act. Makes domestic partners and adult children of public employees eligible to enroll in long term care insurance plans offered to the public employee. Assuming the cost of such plans is subsidized or guaranteed by the state somehow (or else why would this law be necessary) this is just another way of increasing the benefits of public employment at the expense of taxpayers. Passing out more perks to the public employees who largely control California politics. LOSE -1
• AB 532 by Assemblymember Richard S. Gordon (D-Menlo Park) – Local Housing Trust Fund. Tweaks how CA hands out cash for "affordable housing" -- another bill where the interests at stake are not clear. It doesn't increase or decrease the market-distorting slush fund so SNOOZE 0
• AB 637 by Assemblymember Toni G. Atkins (D-San Diego) – Housing assistance. Diverts funds set aside to subsidize "first time home buyers" down payments for the "construction and development of housing developments." Puts funds more directly into pockets of the special interests, now that the banks aren't making loans to marginal borrowers anymore. Distorts housing markets at the expense of middle-class taxpayers. LOSE -1
• AB 952 by Assemblymember Toni G. Atkins (D-San Diego) – Low-income housing tax credits. Complicated tax stuff. Impossible for anybody but a tax lawyer to figure out. My guess is that it is increasing taxes by reducing credits somehow, or perhaps reallocating tax credits to some preferred interest group. In either case, LOSE -1
• AB 1108 by Assemblymember Henry T. Perea (D-Fresno) – Sex offenders: foster care homes: prohibitions. Criminalizes the act of being a former sex offender and "residing, working, or volunteering in specified foster homes or facilities." More pointless persecution of the politicians' current pet villains, most of whom are, on average, far less dangerous than the public employees who deign to criminalize everything these poor saps will ever do. We do not need more victimless crimes; that's the last thing we need. LOSE -1
• AB 1346 by Assemblymember Richard Pan (D-Sacramento) – Postemployment health benefits: Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District: employer contributions. Apparently this increases employer contributions required for Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District employees hired after 2011, to be eligible for post employment health benefits. I fail to understand why this is a State matter, not a Municipal matter. SNOOZE 0
• SB 39 by Senator Kevin De León (D-Los Angeles) – Local agencies: public officers: claims and liability. Requires the forfeiture of a contractual, common law, constitutional, or statutory claims against local public agency employers for retirement or pension rights or benefits, by any local public officer who exercised discretionary authority and who was convicted of a felony for conduct arising out of, or in the performance of, his or her official duties. Prevents felons from claiming California pensions on the stated bases, at least when acting with "discretionary authority." NEWS +1
• SB 57 by Senator Ted W. Lieu (D-Torrance) – Electronic monitoring: removing or disabling GPS device: offense. It was already a violation of parole for a sex offender to remove a tracking device; this makes it a crime with an 180-day minimum sentence. Just more piling on the politicians favorite villain, creating new victimless crimes, and supplying more inmates for California's already overcrowded prisons. LOSE -1
• SB 145 by Senator Fran Pavley (D-Agoura Hills) – Sex offenders: child pornography. Tailor made to increase convictions in cases of police stings and entrapment operations, this bill makes it a felony, if providing pornography to anyone, merely to believe that the recipient is a minor, even if the recipient actually is not a minor and the defendant was stupid to believe otherwise. I pity the poor schmucks who are going to be convicted under this statute, and myself for my tax enslavement to California funding their imprisonment. To them I say, please never, ever, email anything even slightly prurient to anybody, it's just a very dangerous habit to get into. LOSE -1
• SB 215 by Senator Jim Beall (D-San Jose) – Public employee benefits. Makes numerous tweaks to regulations governing Cal-PERS, too many to list. A couple caught my eye: carving out a specific exception to mandatory retirement at age 60 for a Commisioner of the CHP until 2018, and freeing the board to sell uncovered call options outside of regulated option exchanges. I detect the foul scent of special-interest lobbying. LOSE -1.
• SB 313 by Senator Kevin De León (D-Los Angeles) – Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act. Protects police from discipline for being on the DA's "Brady" list, thereby removing a huge disincentive for the police to share exculpatory information with the DA; police can still be disciplined for proven misconduct. NEWS +1
• SB 377 by Senator Ted W. Lieu (D-Torrance) – Public works: project determinations: wage and penalty assessments. A signing message can be found here. Makes it easier for unions to force developers to follow enhanced labor rules required for "public works" by increasing the period of time in which the union must take action; increases uncertainty for developers. LOSE -1
• SB 496 by Senator Roderick D. Wright (D-Los Angeles) – Improper governmental activity: disclosure: protection. A mixed bag. Increases some protections for state employee whistle blowers, but also expands the definition of criminal conduct against non-goverment employers for "making, adopting, or enforcing any rule, regulation, or policy preventing an employee from disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency" basically, ever. So for example, enforcing a rule that employees can't use a cellphone at work could make the employer subject to criminal prosecution if the employee says the rule prevents them from disclosing information. On balance, LOSE -1
• SB 543 by Senator Marty Block (D-San Diego) – Petty theft: enhancements for prior convictions. Puts more petty thieves in prison, an immoral and socially self-destructive idea. If you want approval from Jake, you will need to set up a restitutionary system for thieves that enables them to learn new productive skills, repay their victims, and avoid imprisonment. LOSE -1
• SB 594 by Senator Jerry Hill (D-San Mateo) – Use of public resources. More campaign finance laws designed to protect incumbents by making it more difficult for non-incumbents to get the word out. Again, a mixed bag but in general, complicates election laws and increases burdens for new candidates and non-profits that support them. LOSE -1
Governor Brown also announced that he has vetoed the following bills.
• AB 822 by Assemblymember Isadore Hall III (D-Compton) – Local government retirement plans. A veto message can be found here. Would have imposed requirements on local governments anytime local an "ordinance or measure qualifies for the ballot that proposes to alter, replace, or eliminate the retirement benefit plan of employees of a local government entity." Just a public employee protection measure that deserved to be vetoed. NEWS +1
• AB 857 by Assemblymember Paul Fong (D-Cupertino) – Initiatives: petition circulators. A veto message can be found here. Would have imposed various detailed requirements to make it more difficult, especially for moneyed interests lacking grassroots volunteer support, to gather signatures to place initiatives on the ballot. Would have make the rules for petitioners more complex. Brown may have vetoed this for the wrong reasons, but the result is correct. Jake believes state-sponsored elections are a flawed concept, but making them harder to participate in is moving in the wrong direction. NEWS +1
• AB 917 by Assemblymember Steven Bradford (D-Gardena) – Charter schools: authorization: petition: signatures. A veto message can be found here. Terminology is a bit confusing, but apparently this would have made it easier to satisfy petition requirements for converting a regular school to a charter school, without support of at least one-half the teachers at the school. Schools should be a service offered to parents; since this wouldn't have changed signature requirements for parents of prospective pupils, I'll rate it a SNOOZE 0
• AB 921 by Assemblymember Reginald Jones-Sawyer (D-Los Angeles) – Child welfare services. A veto message can be found here. Another mixed bag; would have made various procedural reforms to the relationship between State and County institutions for child welfare. It would have increased protections and freedom for social worker "whistle blowers," which seems positive. Since it was largely directed to increasing the freedom of speech of social workers, the veto is a LOSE -1
• AB 999 by Assemblymember Rob Bonta (D-Alameda) – Prisoner Protections for Family and Community Health Act. A veto message can be found here. Three words: condoms for prisoners. Governor Brown has presided over a reduction in prison population to about 60,000 people (about what it was in 1990), without increasing violent crime. I'll give him credit for that. That still leaves about 60,000, mostly men, housed under conditions where the incidence of sodomy, some of which is rape, can foreseeably be expected to be relatively high. The State has an obligation to protect prisoners from HIV and other STD's; making condoms available to prisoners reduces the spread of disease. The veto is a LOSE -1
• AB 1127 by Assemblymember Ed Chau (D-Monterey Park) – Legal aid: court interpreters. A veto message can be found here. "This bill would require the Judicial Council, by March 1, 2014, to establish a working group to review, identify, and develop best practices to provide interpreters in civil actions and proceedings, as specified." The State judicial system is a territorial monopoly and as such, incapable of providing quality customer service under any conditions. Veto is SNOOZE 0
• AB 1128 by Assemblymember Rudy Salas (D-Bakersfield) – Alcoholic beverages: underage drinking. A veto message can be found here. Current law states "every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away an alcoholic beverage to a person under 21 years of age, or who purchases any alcoholic beverage for, or furnishes, gives, or gives away any alcoholic beverage to, a person under 21 years of age who thereafter consumes the alcohol and then causes great bodily injury or death to himself, herself, or any other person, is guilty of a misdemeanor." This bill would have made essentially the same acts a felony. We don't need to put more peaceful people in prison. Veto is NEWS +1
• SB 131 by Senator Jim Beall (D-San Jose) – Damages: childhood sexual abuse: statute of limitations. A veto message can be found here. Tailor made for predatory trial attorneys, this bill would have extended the already extremely long and open-ended statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse ("within 8 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by sexual abuse, whichever occurs later") in specified cases, and done so retroactively for cases already being heard. Yuck. Veto is NEWS +1
• SB 467 by Senator Mark Leno (D-San Francisco) – Privacy: electronic communications: warrant. A veto message can be found here. Would have expanded privacy protection by requiring government disclosure of information obtained by warrant, among other things. The disclosure requirement would have made criminal investigations based on electronic records more difficult and less routine. That would have been a good thing. Veto is therefore a LOSE -1
• SB 598 by Senator Jerry Hill (D-San Mateo) – Biosimilars. A veto message can be found here. A high-tech law from a high-tech district. Provides complex rules for pharmacists filling prescriptions with "biosimilars" and therefore intrudes into the patient-pharmacist relationship. Jake is not leaping for joy and recognizes the veto was for the wrong reason, but nonetheless this law deserved it. NEWS +1
• SB 649 by Senator Mark Leno (D-San Francisco) – Possession of controlled substances: penalties. A veto message can be found here. Would have reduced penalties for "unlawful possession of certain controlled substances, including, among others, opiates, opium, opium derivatives, mescaline, peyote, tetrahydrocannabinols, and cocaine base" and made a misdemeanor charge possible is such cases. Veto message implies that a misdemeanor would never be appropriate in cases of heroin or cocaine, and claims this issue should be deferred for consideration with SB 150. LOSE -1
• SB 744 by Senator Ricardo Lara (D-Bell Gardens) – Pupils: involuntary transfer: county community schools and community day schools. A veto message can be found here. Would have limited and controlled imprisonment of children in certain schools, even if only partially. Children should never be forced to attend school; this bill would not have prevented that in all cases but would have in some. Veto is a LOSE -1
10-11-2013
SACRAMENTO – Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. today announced that he has signed the following bills.
• AB 48 by Assemblymember Nancy Skinner (D-Berkeley) – Firearms: large-capacity magazines. "This bill would make it a misdemeanor, punishable
by a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment in a county jail not
to exceed 6 months, or by both that fine and imprisonment, to knowingly
manufacture,
import, keep for sale, offer or expose for sale, or give, lend, buy,
or receive any large capacity magazine conversion kit that is capable
of converting an ammunition feeding device into a large-capacity
magazine." LOSE -1
• AB 170 by Assemblymember Steven Bradford (D-Gardena) – Assault weapons and .50 BMG rifles. "This bill would limit “person” to an individual
for . . permit purposes for assault weapons, .50 BMG rifles, and
machineguns, and other
purposes related to the regulation of assault weapons and .50 BMG
rifles" Not such a big deal, but LOSE -1
• AB 231 by Assemblymember Philip Y. Ting (D-San Francisco) – Firearms: criminal storage. Establishes "the offense of criminal storage of a
firearm in the 3rd degree, when a person keeps a loaded firearm within
any premises under his or her custody or control and negligently stores
or leaves a loaded firearm in a location where the person knows, or
reasonably should know, that a child is likely to gain access to the
firearm . . " The Watertown reactionary bill, as if it would have made a difference. In practice will just be another excuse to prosecute and criminalize gun ownership. LOSE -1
• AB 260 by Assemblymember Richard S. Gordon (D-Menlo Park) – Individualized county child care subsidy plans.
• AB 263 by Assemblymember Roger Hernández (D-West Covina) – Employment: retaliation: immigration-related practices.
• AB 274 by Assemblymember Susan Bonilla (D-Concord) – Child care and development services.
• AB 290 by Assemblymember Luis Alejo (D-Salinas) – Child day care: childhood nutrition training.
• AB 442 by Assemblymember Adrin Nazarian (D-Sherman Oaks) – Employees: wages.
• AB 466 by Assemblymember Sharon Quirk-Silva (D-Fullerton) – Federal transportation funds.
• AB 500 by Assemblymember Tom Ammiano (D-San Francisco) – Firearms. Requires the state DOJ "to immediately notify the dealer to delay the transfer of a
firearm to a purchaser if the records of the department, or if
specified records available to the department, indicate that the
purchaser has been taken into custody and placed in a facility for
mental health treatment or evaluation, that he or she has been arrested
for, or charged with, a crime, or that the purchaser is attempting to
purchase more than one firearm within a 30-day period." LOSE -1
• AB 538 by Assemblymember Richard Pan (D-Sacramento) – Firearms. Among fairly technical tweaks to hand gun carry laws, makes it a misdemeanor omit "any
applicable waiting period exemption information" from a firearms transfer record. LOSE -1
• AB 539 by Assemblymember Richard Pan (D-Sacramento) – Firearm possession: prohibitions: transfer to licensed dealer. Allows anyone who is prohibited from owning or
possessing a firearm pursuant to certain laws "to transfer any firearm or firearms in his or her
possession, or of which he or she is the owner, to a licensed firearms
dealer for the duration of the prohibition if the prohibition on owning
or possessing the firearm will expire on a date specified in the court
order." Very slight loosening of the manacles. NEWS +1
• AB 562 by Assemblymember Das G. Williams (D-Santa Barbara) – Economic development subsidies: review by local agencies.
• AB 628 by Assemblymember Jeff Gorell (R-Camarillo) – Energy management plans for harbor and port districts. A signing message can be found here.
• AB 711 by Assemblymember Anthony Rendon (D-Lakewood) – Hunting: nonlead ammunition. A signing message can be found here. Limits all amunition for hunting to specified types of center-fire non-lead ammunition. Jake is not a hunter, and has no opinion as to whether this is a reasonable restriction or likely to have any discernible public benefit. Whatever the reasons, this bill limits hunters' freedom of action without any discernible offsetting increase in freedom elesewhere. LOSE -1
• AB 848 by Assemblymember Jim Patterson (R-Fresno) – Adoption.
• AB 906 by Assemblymember Richard Pan (D-Sacramento) – Personal services contracts.
• AB 1039 by Assemblymember Isadore Hall III (D-Compton) – Local gambling control.
• AB 1042 by Assemblymember Isadore Hall III (D-Compton) – Indian Gaming Special Distribution Fund. A signing message can be found here.
• AB 1131 by Assemblymember Nancy Skinner (D-Berkeley) – Firearms.
• AB 1213 by Assemblymember Richard H. Bloom (D-Santa Monica) – Bobcat Protection Act of 2013. A signing message can be found here.
• AB 1257 by Assemblymember Raul Bocanegra (D-Los Angeles) – Energy: State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission: natural gas.
• AB 1386 by the Committee on Labor and Employment – Employment: employee complaints: final orders.
• AB 1387 by Assemblymember Roger Hernández (D-West Covina) – Car washes.
• SB 109 by Senator Ellen Corbett (D-Hayward) – Charter-party carriers: limousines: emergency exits.
• SB 127 by Senator Ted Gaines (R-Rocklin) – Firearms: mentally disordered persons.
• SB 194 by Senator Cathleen Galgiani (D-Stockton) – Vehicles: electronic wireless communications device: prohibitions.
• SB 277 by Senator Jim Beall (D-San Jose) – State Peace Officers' and Firefighters' Defined Contribution Plan.
• SB 288 by Senator Ted W. Lieu (D-Torrance) – Employment protections: time off.
• SB 335 by Senator Leland Yee (D-San Francisco) – Expenditures: service contracts.
• SB 363 by Senator Roderick D. Wright (D-Los Angeles) – Firearms: criminal storage: unsafe handguns: fees.
• SB 400 by Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson (D-Santa Barbara) – Employment protections: victims of domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking.
• SB 472 by Senator Jerry Hill (D-San Mateo) – Gaming: licenses.
• SB 683 by Senator Marty Block (D-San Diego) – Firearms: firearm safety certificate.
Governor Brown also announced that he has vetoed the following bills.
• AB 12 by Assemblymember Ken Cooley (D-Rancho Cordova) – State government: Administrative Procedure Act: standardized regulatory impact analyses. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 169 by Assemblymember Roger Dickinson (D-Sacramento) – Unsafe handguns. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 180 by Assemblymember Rob Bonta (D-Alameda) – Registration and licensing of firearms: City of Oakland. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 199 by Assemblymember Chris Holden (D-Pasadena) – Institutional purchasers: sale of California produce. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 729 by Assemblymember Roger Hernández (D-West Covina) – Evidentiary privileges: union agent-represented worker privilege. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 1208 by Assemblymember Richard Pan (D-Sacramento) – Insurance affordability. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 1290 by Assemblymember John A. Pérez (D-Los Angeles) –Transportation planning. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 110 by Senator Mark DeSaulnier (D-Concord) – East Span, San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge Safety Review Task Force. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 299 by Senator Mark DeSaulnier (D-Concord) – Firearms: lost or stolen: reports. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 338 by Senator Jerry Hill (D-San Mateo) – Charter-party carriers of passengers: limousines: fire extinguishers. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 374 by Senator Darrell Steinberg (D-Sacramento) – Firearms: assault weapons. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 475 by Senator Mark Leno (D-San Francisco) – Agricultural District 1-A: firearm sales at the Cow Palace. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 516 by Senator Darrell Steinberg (D-Sacramento) – Foreign labor contractors: registration. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 567 by Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson (D-Santa Barbara) – Firearms: shotguns. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 654 by Senator Mark Leno (D-San Francisco) – Ballot measure petitions: recall petitions: translations. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 755 by Senator Lois Wolk (D-Davis) – Firearms: prohibited persons. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 804 by Senator Ricardo Lara (D-Bell Gardens) – Solid waste: energy. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 811 by Senator Ricardo Lara (D-Bell Gardens) – State Highway Route 710. A veto message can be found here.
10-10-2013
SACRAMENTO – Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. today announced that he has signed the following bills.
• AB 218 by Assemblymember Roger Dickinson (D-Sacramento) – Employment applications: criminal history.
• AB 256 by Assemblymember Cristina Garcia (D-Bell Gardens) – Pupils: grounds for suspension and expulsion: bullying.
• AB 389 by Assemblymember Das G. Williams (D-Santa Barbara) – Private schools: employees: criminal background checks.
• AB 514 by Assemblymember Rob Bonta (D-Alameda) – The Safe Schools for Safe Learning Act of 2013.
• AB 547 by Assemblymember Rudy Salas (D-Bakersfield) – 21st Century High School After School Safety and Enrichment for Teens program.
• AB 595 by Assemblymember Jimmy Gomez (D-Northeast Los Angeles) – Community colleges: priority enrollment.
• AB 610 by Assemblymember Katcho Achadjian (R-San Luis Obispo) – State hospitals: involuntary treatment.
• AB 626 by Assemblymember Nancy Skinner (D-Berkeley) – School nutrition.
• AB 635 by Assemblymember Tom Ammiano (D-San Francisco) – Drug overdose treatment: liability.
• AB 647 by Assemblymember Wesley Chesbro (D-Arcata) – The Alcoholic Beverage Control Act: beer manufacturers: containers.
• AB 753 by Assemblymember Bonnie Lowenthal (D-Long Beach) – Cognitively impaired adults: caregiver resource centers.
• AB 899 by Assemblymember Shirley N. Weber (D-San Diego) – Academic content standards: English language development standards.
• AB 955 by Assemblymember Das G. Williams (D-Santa Barbara) – Community colleges: intersession extension programs. A signing message can be found here.
• AB 974 by Assemblymember Isadore Hall III (D-Compton) – Patient transfer: nonmedical reasons: notice to contact person or next of kin.
• AB 1025 by Assemblymember Cristina Garcia (D-Bell Gardens) – Public postsecondary education: credit by examination.
• AB 1068 by Assemblymember Richard H. Bloom (D-Santa Monica) – Pupil records.
• AB 1358 by Assemblymember Paul Fong (D-Cupertino) – Student body association: student representation fees.
• SB 168 by William W. Monning (D-Carmel) – Farm labor contractors: successors: wages and penalties.
• SB 236 by Senator Fran Pavley (D-Agoura Hills) – School districts: four-day school week: Moorpark Unified School District.
• SB 368 by Senator Fran Pavley (D-Agoura Hills) – Teachers: added authorization in special education.
• SB 390 by Senator Roderick D. Wright (D-Los Angeles) – Employee wage withholdings: failure to remit.
• SB 435 by Senator Alex Padilla (D-Pacoima) – Compensation: meal and rest or recovery periods.
• SB 440 by Senator Alex Padilla (D-Pacoima) – Public postsecondary education: Student Transfer Achievement Reform Act.
• SB 530 by Senator Roderick D. Wright (D-Los Angeles) – Criminal offenders: rehabilitation.
• SB 534 by Senator Ed Hernandez (D-West Covina) – Health and care facilities.
• SB 590 by Senator Kevin De León (D-Los Angeles) – School personnel: professional development for classified school employees.
• SB 651 by Senator Fran Pavley (D-Agoura Hills) – Developmental centers and state hospitals.
• SB 669 by Senator Bob Huff (R-Diamond Bar) – Emergency medical care: epinephrine auto-injectors.
• SB 681 by Senator Ed Hernandez (D-West Covina) – Community college districts: personal property.
Governor Brown also announced that he has vetoed the following bills.
• AB 300 by Assemblymember Henry T. Perea (D-Fresno) – Telecommunications: prepaid mobile telephony services: state surcharge and fees: local charges collection. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 375 by Assemblymember Joan Buchanan (D-Alamo) – School employees: dismissal or suspension: hearing. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 622 by Assemblymember Nora Campos (D-San Jose) – School districts: charter school petitions: Internet posting. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 704 by Assemblymember Robert Blumenfield (D-Woodland Hills) – Emergency medical services: military experience. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 1287 by Assemblymember Sharon Quirk-Silva (D-Fullerton) – Student financial aid: Cal Grant Program eligibility. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 1409 by Assemblymember Steven Bradford (D-Gardena) – Public utilities: voice communications: Moore Universal Telephone Service Act. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 284 by Senator Kevin De León (D-Los Angeles) – Income taxes: credits: contributions to education funds. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 285 by Senator Kevin[url"> De León (D-Los Angeles) – Student financial aid: Cal Grant Program. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 398 by Senator Cathleen Galgiani (D-Stockton) – Horse racing: distribution of proceeds. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 655 by Senator Roderick D. Wright (D-Los Angeles) – Fair Employment and Housing Act: unlawful practices. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 723 by Senator Lou Correa (D-Santa Ana) – Veterans. A veto message can be found here.
10-9-2013
SACRAMENTO – Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. today announced that he has signed the following bills.
• AB 140 by Assemblymember Roger Dickinson (D-Sacramento) – Undue influence.
• AB 191 by Assemblymember Raul Bocanegra (D-Los Angeles) – CalFresh: categorical eligibility.
• AB 247 by Assemblymember Donald P. Wagner (R-Irvine) – Personal income taxes: voluntary contribution: California Fund for Senior Citizens. If they made all taxes voluntary, that would be news. SNOOZE 0
• AB 394 by Assemblymember Mariko Yamada (D-Davis) – Personal income tax: voluntary contributions: Alzheimer's disease. Ditto SNOOZE 0
• AB 498 by Assemblymember Rocky Chávez (R-Oceanside) – Medi-Cal.
• AB 602 by Assemblymember Mariko Yamada (D-Davis) – Mentally and developmentally disabled persons: reporting abuse.
• AB 620 by Assemblymember Joan Buchanan (D-Alamo) – Health and care facilities: missing patients and participants.
• AB 663 by Assemblymember Jimmy Gomez (D-Northeast Los Angeles) – Care facilities: training requirements.
• AB 849 by Assemblymember Cristina Garcia (D-Bell Gardens) – Protection of victims: address confidentiality.
• AB 1041 by Assemblymember Wesley Chesbro (D-Arcata) – Developmental services: Employment First Policy.
• AB 1202 by Assemblymember Nancy Skinner (D-Berkeley) – Occupational safety and health standards: hazardous drugs.
• AB 1232 by Assemblymember V. Manuel Pérez (D-Coachella) – Developmental services: quality assessment system.
• SB 126 by Senator Darrell Steinberg (D-Sacramento) – Health care coverage: pervasive developmental disorder or autism.
• SB 345 by Senator Noreen Evans (D-Santa Rosa) – Attorneys: annual membership fees.
• SB 367 by Senator Marty Block (D-San Diego) – Developmental services: regional centers: cultural and linguistic competency.
• SB 468 by Senator Bill Emmerson (R-Redlands) – Developmental services: statewide Self-Determination Program. Implements "state Self-Determination Program" "to provide
participants and their families, within an individual budget, increased
flexibility and choice, and greater control over decisions, resources,
and needed and desired services and supports to implement their IPP." "State self-determination program" -- what irony. What doublespeak. SNOOZE 0
• SB 494 by Senator William W. Monning (D-Carmel) – Health care providers.Honestly, Jake doesn't have the time it would take to understand this bill. But because the Digest includes the sentence "By imposing new requirements on health care service plans, the willful violation of which would
be a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program" it is scored as a LOSE -1
• SB 555 by Senator Lou Correa (D-Santa Ana) – Developmental services: regional centers: individual program plans and individualized family service plans. Requires state agencies providing developmental disability "services" to families that produce certain "planning" documents to do so in the language of the family. SNOOZE 0
Governor Brown also announced that he has vetoed the following bills.
• AB 50 by Assemblymember Richard Pan (D-Sacramento) – Health care coverage: Medi-Cal: eligibility. A veto message can be found here. Provided "that a woman shall be eligible for
full-scope Medi-Cal benefits if her income is less than 100% of the
federal poverty level as determined, counted, and valued in accordance
with federal law" currently cutoff is 60-100%. Newsflash: Jerry and the Dems will expand Medi-Cal, but in another set of bills. This veto merely delays things slightly. SNOOZE 0
• AB 174 by Assemblymember Rob Bonta (D-Alameda) – Public school health centers. A veto message can be found here. Requires the State Department of Public Health to
establish, within the County of Alameda, a grant pilot program within
the Public School Health Center Support Program that would be known as
Promoting Resilience: Offering Mental Health Interventions to Support
Education (PROMISE). Anything with such a sick acronym can't be good. NEWS +1
• AB 477 by Assemblymember Ed Chau (D-Monterey Park) – Elder and dependent adult abuse: mandated reporting. A veto message can be found here. Extends mandated reporting requirement for elder abuse to notary publics, subject to a civil penalty. The phrase "mandated reporting" is all you need to know. NEWS +1
• AB 888 by Assemblymember Roger Dickinson (D-Sacramento) – State Bar of California: enforcement actions. A veto message can be found here. Among other things, would have enable the State Bar to bring civil actions for "unlicensed practice of law." This would have benefited establishment lawyers but not freedom. NEWS +1
• AB 1231 by Assemblymember V. Manuel Pérez (D-Coachella) – Regional centers: telehealth. A veto message can be found here. Requires the state to "inform all regional centers that any
appropriate health care service and dentistry may be provided through
the use of telehealth, as defined, to consumers of regional center
services." Bureaucrats controlling Bureaucrats. SNOOZE 0
• SB 158 by Senator Lou Correa (D-Santa Ana) – Autism services: demonstration program. A veto message can be found here. Would have set up a Regional Center Excellence in Community Autism Partnerships (RE CAP) and centralized what is already being done by other legislation; as such not of great significance. SNOOZE 0
• SB 582 by Senator Stephen T. Knight (R-Palmdale) – Tax information: administration. A veto message can be found here. Required the Franchise Tax Board, the State Board of Equalization, and the
Employment Development Department to collaborate and focus the agencies’
current and future information technology efforts to conduct a
feasibility study on the development of a single Internet Web site
portal and, upon a joint
determination by the agencies that a need exists to improve
cost-effective services to taxpayers and an appropriation by the
Legislature, to consolidate forms, applications, and other documents to
reduce or eliminate the number of multiple submissions of the same
information by taxpayers. Pass or fail, this bill makes no difference in personal liberty, at most just in appearances. SNOOZE 0
10-8-2013
SACRAMENTO – Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. today announced that he has signed the following bills.
• AB 34 by Assemblymember Roger Hernández (D-West Covina) – State historical resources.
• AB 361 by Assemblymember Holly J. Mitchell (D-Los Angeles) – Medi-Cal:
Health Homes for Medi-Cal Enrollees and Section 1115 Waiver
Demonstration Populations with Chronic and Complex Conditions.
• AB 409 by Assemblymember Sharon Quirk-Silva (D-Fullerton) – Political
Reform Act of 1974: statements of economic interests: online filing.
• AB 460 by Assemblymember Tom Ammiano (D-San Francisco) – Health care coverage: infertility.
• AB 552 by Assemblymember Paul Fong (D-Cupertino) – Political Reform Act of 1974: collection of fines.
• AB 720 by Assemblymember Nancy Skinner (D-Berkeley) – Inmates: health care enrollment.
• AB 744 by Assemblymember Brian Dahle (R-Bieber) – Timber harvesting plans: exempt activities.
• AB 904 by Assemblymember Wesley Chesbro (D-Arcata) – Forest practices: working forest management plans.
• AB 1047 by Assemblymember Eric F. Linder (R-Corona) – Commercial driver's licenses.
• AB 1090 by Assemblymember Paul Fong (D-Cupertino) – Public officers: conflicts of interest: contracts.
• AB 1121 by Assemblymember Toni G. Atkins (D-San Diego) – Gender identity: petition for change of name.
• AB 1253 by Assemblymember Robert Blumenfield (D-Woodland Hills) – Vehicles: mobile advertising displays.
• AB 1309 by Assemblymember Henry T. Perea (D-Fresno) – Workers' compensation: professional athletes.
• AB 1418 by the Committee on Elections and Redistricting – The Political Reform Act of 1974: omnibus bill.
• SB 142 by Senator Mark DeSaulnier (D-Concord) – Public transit.
• SB 208 by Senator Ricardo Lara (D-Bell Gardens) – Public social services: contracting.
• SB 239 by Senator Ed Hernandez (D-West Covina) – Medi-Cal: hospitals:
quality assurance fees: distinct part skilled nursing facilities.
• SB 346 by Senator Jim Beall (D-San Jose) – Public social services: records.
• SB 470 by Senator Roderick D. Wright (D-Los Angeles) – Community development: economic opportunity.
• SB 484 by Senator Mark Wyland (R-Escondido) – Tax preparers.
Governor Brown also announced that he has vetoed the following bills.
• AB 411 by Assemblymember Richard Pan (D-Sacramento) – Medi-Cal: performance measures. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 3 by Senator Leland Yee (D-San Francisco) – Political Reform Act of 1974. A veto message can be found here.
10-7-2013
SACRAMENTO – Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. today announced that he has signed the following bills.
• AB 32 by Assemblymember John A. Pérez (D-Los Angeles) – Insurance
taxes: income taxes: credits: community development financial
institution investments.
• AB 217 by Assemblymember Steven Bradford (D-Gardena) – Electricity: solar electricity: low-income households.
• AB 270 by Assemblymember Steven Bradford (D-Gardena) – Public utilities: ratepayer-funded energy efficiency assistance.
• AB 327 by Assemblymember Henry T. Perea (D-Fresno) – Electricity:
natural gas: rates: net energy metering: California Renewables Portfolio
Standard Program. A signing message can be found here.
• AB 415 by Assemblymember Cristina Garcia (D-Bell Gardens) – Solar energy: water heating.
• AB 417 by Assemblymember Jim L. Frazier (D-Oakley) – Environmental
quality: California Environmental Quality Act: bicycle transportation
plan.
• AB 576 by Assemblymember V. Manuel Pérez (D-Coachella) – Revenue
Recovery and Collaborative Enforcement Team Act: pilot program. A
signing message can be found here.
• AB 650 by Assemblymember Adrin Nazarian (D-Sherman Oaks) – State government: general services: Natural Gas Services Program.
• AB 719 by Assemblymember Roger Hernández (D-West Covina) – Energy: energy efficiency: street light pole.
• AB 796 by Assemblymember Al Muratsuchi (D-Torrance) – Advanced electrical distributed generation technology.
• AB 924 by Assemblymember Frank Bigelow (R-O’Neals) – Grand theft.
• AB 979 by Assemblymember Shirley N. Weber (D-San Diego) – Peace
officers: Maritime Peace Officer Standards Training Act of 2013.
• AB 1000 by Assemblymember Bob Wieckowski (D-Fremont) – Physical
therapists: direct access to services: professional corporations.
• AB 1060 by Assemblymember Steve Fox (D-Palmdale) – Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission.
• AB 1132 by Assemblymember Susan Talamantes Eggman (D-Stockton) – Agriculture: livestock drugs and commercial feed.
• AB 1319 by Assemblymember Susan Talamantes Eggman (D-Stockton) – Agriculture.
• SB 298 by Senator Mark Wyland (R-Escondido) – Local government: supplemental law enforcement services.
• SB 365 by Senator Lois Wolk (D-Davis) – Jail construction: funding.
• SB 562 by Senator Cathleen Galgiani (D-Stockton) – Dentists: mobile or portable dental units.
• SB 667 by Senator Richard D. Roth (D-Riverside) – Retail sale of shelled eggs.
Governor Brown also announced that he has vetoed the following bills.
• AB 571 by Assemblymember Mike Gatto (D-Los Angeles) – Agricultural
pest control: citrus disease prevention. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 1200 by Assemblymember Marc B. Levine (D-San Rafael) – Recycled
water: agricultural irrigation impoundments: pilot project. A veto
message can be found here.
• AB 1235 by Assemblymember Richard S. Gordon (D-Menlo Park) – Local
agencies: financial management training. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 1401 by the Committee on Judiciary – Jury duty: eligibility. A veto message can be found here.
10-5-2013
SACRAMENTO – Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. today announced that he has signed the following bills.
• AB 66 by Assemblymember Al Muratsuchi (D-Torrance) – Electricity: system reliability.
• AB 127 by Assemblymember Nancy Skinner (D-Berkeley) – Fire safety: fire retardants: building insulation.
• AB 149 by Assemblymember Shirley N. Weber (D-San Diego) – Voting rights: county probation departments.
• AB 227 by Assemblymember Mike Gatto (D-Los Angeles) – Proposition 65: enforcement.
• AB 272 by Assemblymember Jimmy Gomez (D-Los Angeles) – Rabies: vaccinations.
• AB 297 by Assemblymember Wesley Chesbro (D-Arcata) – Primary care clinics.
• AB 304 by Assemblymember Das G. Williams (D-Santa Barbara) – Pesticides: toxic air contaminant: control measures.
• AB 341 by Assemblymember Roger Dickinson (D-Sacramento) – Green building standards.
• AB 401 by Assemblymember Tom F. Daly (D-Anaheim) – Transportation: design-build: highways.
• AB 425 by Assemblymember Toni G. Atkins (D-San Diego) – Pesticides:
copper-based antifouling paint: leach rate determination; mitigation
measure recommendations.
• AB 440 by Assemblymember Mike Gatto (D-Los Angeles) – Hazardous materials: releases: local agency cleanup.
• AB 446 by Assemblymember Holly J. Mitchell (D-Los Angeles) – HIV testing.
• AB 482 by Assemblymember Toni G. Atkins (D-San Diego) – California Cultural and Historical Endowment.
• AB 633 by Assemblymember Rudy Salas (D-Bakersfield) – Emergency medical services: civil liability.
• AB 691 by Assemblymember Al Muratsuchi (D-Torrance) – State lands: granted trust lands: sea level rise.
• AB 755 by Assemblymember Tom Ammiano (D-San Francisco) – Suicide barriers.
• AB 1097 by Assemblymember Brian Nestande (R- Palm Desert) – Fish and Game Commission: Mirage Trail.
• AB 1112 by Assemblymember Tom Ammiano (D-San Francisco) – Transportation transactions and use taxes: Bay Area.
• AB 1177 by Assemblymember Raul Bocanegra (D-Los Angeles) – Structural fumigation.
• AB 1274 by Assemblymember Steven Bradford (D-Gardena) – Privacy: customer electrical or natural gas usage data.
• AB 1329 by Assemblymember V. Manuel Pérez (D-Coachella) – Hazardous waste.
• AB 1382 by the Committee on Health - Reporting.
• SB 191 by Senator Alex Padilla (D-Pacoima) – Emergency medical services.
• SB 291 by Senator Jerry Hill (D-San Mateo) – Public Utilities Commission: safety enforcement: gas and electrical corporations.
• SB 360 by Senator Alex Padilla (D-Pacoima) – Certification of voting systems.
• SB 613 by Senator Mark DeSaulnier (D-Concord) – Bay Area Toll Authority.
• SB 656 by Senator Roderick D. Wright (D-Los Angeles) – Electrical
restructuring: natural gas restructuring: information practices.
• SB 752 by Senator Richard D. Roth (D-Riverside) – Commercial and industrial common interest developments.
• SB 758 by Senator Marty Block (D-San Diego) – General plans: City of Coronado.
• SB 825 by the Committee on Governance and Finance – Government finance.
Governor Brown also announced that he has vetoed the following bills.
• AB 340 by Assemblymember Steven Bradford (D-Gardena) – Public
utilities: Electric Program Investment Charge: contracting. A veto
message can be found here.
• AB 683 by Assemblymember Kevin Mullin (D-South San Francisco) – Local
government: fines and penalties: assessments. A veto message can be
found here.
• AB 714 by Assemblymember Bob Wieckowski (D-Fremont) – Roman Reed
Spinal Cord Injury Research Fund. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 912 by Assemblymember Sharon Quirk-Silva (D-Fullerton) – Health
care coverage: fertility preservation. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 695 by Senator Roderick D. Wright (D-Los Angeles) – California
Science Center: parking facilities. A veto message can be found here.
10-4-2013
SACRAMENTO – Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. today announced that he has signed the following bills.
• AB 58 by Assemblymember Bob Wieckowski (D-Fremont) – Medical experiments: human subjects.
• AB 64 by Assemblymember Tim M. Donnelly (R-Twin Peaks) – Vehicles: fifth-wheel travel trailers.
• AB 359 by Assemblymember Chris Holden (D-Pasadena) – Vehicle rental agreements: customer facility charge.
• AB 402 by Assemblymember Tom Ammiano (D-San Francisco) – Disability income insurance: mental illness.
• AB 410 by Assemblymember Reginald Jones-Sawyer (D-Los Angeles) – Public employee health benefits: enrollment.
• AB 451 by Assemblymember Susan Talamantes Eggman (D-Stockton) – Healing arts: therapists and counselors: licensing.
• AB 483 by Assemblymember Philip Y. Ting (D-San Francisco) – Local
government: taxes, fees, assessments, and charges: definitions.
• AB 908 by Assemblymember Susan Bonilla (D-Concord) – Unemployment insurance: use of information.
• AB 1094 by Assemblymember Cheryl Brown (D-San Bernardino) – CalWORKs: eligibility.
• AB 1168 by Assemblymember Richard Pan (D-Sacramento) – Safe body art.
• AB 1252 by the Committee on Health – Retail food safety.
• AB 1280 by Assemblymember John A. Pérez (D-Los Angeles) – Public
assistance payments and unemployment compensation benefits: electronic
fund transfer: qualifying accounts.
• AB 1379 by the Committee on Public Employees, Retirement and Social Security – Teachers' Retirement Law.
• AB 1381 by the Committee on Public Employees, Retirement and Social
Security – State Teachers’ Retirement Law: pension reform.
• AB 1417 by the Committee on Elections and Redistricting – Elections.
• AB 1428 by Assemblymember Connie Conway (R-Tulare) – California Health Benefit Exchange: employees and contractors.
• SB 13 by Senator Jim Beall (D-San Jose) – Public employees’ retirement benefits.
• SB 118 by Senator Ted W. Lieu (D-Torrance) – Unemployment insurance: education and workforce investment systems.
• SB 220 by Senator Jim Beall (D-San Jose) – California Public Employees' Pension Reform Act of 2013: administration.
• SB 252 by Senator Carol Liu (D-La Canada Flintridge) – CalWORKs: welfare-to-work requirements.
• SB 274 by Senator Mark Leno (D-San Francisco) – Family law: parentage: child custody and support.
• SB 294 by Senator Bill Emmerson (R-Redlands) – Sterile drug products.
• SB 362 by Senator Alex Padilla (D-Pacoima) – Voting procedures: natural disasters.
• SB 364 by Senator Steinberg (D-Sacramento) – Mental health.
• SB 672 by Senator Mark Leno (D-San Francisco) – CalFresh: eligibility: guidelines.
• SB 806 by Senator Ben Hueso (D-San Diego) – Department of Motor Vehicles: license plate alternatives pilot program.
Governor Brown also announced that he has vetoed the following bills.
• AB 53 by Assemblymember John A. Pérez (D-Los Angeles) – Governor's
Office of Business and Economic Development: biennial California
Economic Development Strategic Plan. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 285 by Assemblymember Cheryl Brown (D-San Bernardino) –
Microenterprises: economic development. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 205 by Senator Ellen Corbett (D-Hayward) – Prescription drugs: labeling. A veto message can be found here.
10-3-2013
SACRAMENTO – Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. today announced that he has signed the following bills.
• AB 214 by Assemblymember Nancy Skinner (D-Berkeley) – Voting: state of emergency.
• AB 513 by Assemblymember Jim L. Frazier (D-Oakley) – Tire recycling program: rubberized asphalt.
• AB 529 by Assemblymember Bonnie Lowenthal (D-Long Beach) – Vehicles: motor carriers: inspections and fees.
• AB 530 by Assemblymember Sharon Quirk-Silva (D-Fullerton) – Vote by mail ballots: telephone applications.
• AB 593 by Assemblymember Bill Quirk (D-Hayward) – Alcoholic beverages: Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control.
• AB 664 by Assemblymember Das G. Williams (D-Santa Barbara) – Gold Coast Transit District.
• AB 721 by Assemblymember Steven Bradford (D-Gardena) – Controlled substances: transporting with intent to sell.
• AB 826 by Assemblymember Reginald Jones-Sawyer (D-South Los Angeles) – State property: surplus.
• AB 1186 by Assemblymember Susan Bonilla (D-Concord) – State Athletic Commission.
• AB 1299 by Assemblymember Steven Bradford (D-Gardena) –
Telecommunications: universal service programs: California Advanced
Services Fund.
• AB 1398 by the Committee on Natural Resources – Solid waste: recycling: enforcement agencies.
• AB 1403 by the Committee on Judiciary – Family law.
• AB 1419 by the Committee on Elections and Redistricting - Presidential general elections: party qualifications.
• SB 155 by Senator Alex Padilla (D-Pacoima) – Vehicles: motor vehicle manufacturers and distributors.
• SB 211 by Senator Ed Hernandez (D-West Covina) – Tax administration:
disclosure of information: Franchise Tax Board and cities.
• SB 279 by Senator Loni Hancock (D-Berkeley) – San Francisco Bay Restoration Authority.
• SB 304 by Senator Ted W. Lieu (D-Torrance) – Healing arts: boards.
• SB 305 by Senator Ted W. Lieu (D-Torrance) – Healing arts: boards.
• SB 328 by Senator Stephen T. Knight (R-Palmdale) – Counties: public works contracts.
• SB 463 by Senator Fran Pavley (D-Agoura Hills) – Sentencing.
• SB 485 by Senator Ronald S. Calderon (D-Montebello) – Weighmasters: junk dealers and recyclers.
• SB 558 by Senator Ted W. Lieu (D-Torrance) – Reporters' shield law.
• SB 591 by Senator Anthony J. Cannella (R-Ceres) – Renewable energy
resources: local publicly owned electric utility: hydroelectric
generation facility.
• SB 609 by Senator Lois Wolk (D-Davis) – Office of the State Long-Term Care Ombudsman.
• SB 740 by Senator Alex Padilla (D-Pacoima) – Telecommunications:
universal service programs: California Advanced Services Fund.
• SB 788 by the Committee on Transportation and Housing – Transportation.
Governor Brown also announced that he has vetoed the following bills.
• AB 841 by Assemblymember Norma J. Torres (D-Pomona) – Junk dealers and
recyclers: nonferrous materials: payment. A veto message can be found here.
• AB 909 by Assemblymember Adam Gray (D-Merced) – Metal theft and related recycling crimes. A veto message can be found here.
10-1-2013
SACRAMENTO – Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. today announced that he has signed the following bills.
• AB 234 by Assemblymember Mike Gatto (D-Los Angeles) – Claims against the state: payment.
• AB 351 by Assemblymember Tim M. Donnelly (R-Twin Peaks) – Civil liberties: suspension of habeas corpus for American citizens.
• AB 511 by Assemblymember Richard Pan (D-Sacramento) – Income taxes:
voluntary contributions: American Red Cross, California Chapters Fund.
• AB 619 by Assemblymember Cristina Garcia (D-Bell Gardens) – Court facilities.
• AB 630 by Assemblymember Chris Holden (D-Pasadena) – Architects.
• AB 648 by Assemblymember Reginald Jones-Sawyer (D-Los Angeles) – Court reporters.
• AB 681 by Assemblymember Melissa Melendez (R-Lake Elsinore) – Spousal support.
• AB 884 by Assemblymember Susan Bonilla (D-Concord) – County Board of Parole Commissioners: parole terms.
• AB 934 by Assemblymember Ken Cooley (D-Rancho Cordova) – Local agencies: unclaimed money.
• AB 971 by Assemblymember Cristina Garcia (D-Bell Gardens) – Public
agency employers: paratransit providers: criminal history information.
• AB 989 by Assemblymember Kevin Mullin (D-South San Francisco) – State teachers' retirement: account statements.
• AB 1004 by Assemblymember Adam Gray (D-Merced) – Criminal procedure.
• AB 1116 by Assemblymember Isadore Hall III (D-Compton) – Alcoholic beverages: licensees.
• AB 1245 by Assemblymember V. Manuel Pérez (D-Coachella) – Tribal gaming: compact ratification.
• AB 1425 by the Committee on Governmental Organization – Alcoholic beverages.
• SB 203 by Senator Fran Pavley (D-Agoura Hills) – Local transportation funds: Ventura County.
• SB 243 by Senator Mark Wyland (R-Escondido) – Professional clinical counselors.
• SB 255 by Senator Anthony J. Cannella (R-Ceres) – Disorderly conduct: invasion of privacy.
• SB 318 by Senator Jerry Hill (D-San Mateo) – Consumer loans: Pilot
Program for Increased Access to Responsible Small Dollar Loans.
• SB 416 by Senator Carol Liu (D-La Canada Flintridge) – Surplus residential property.
• SB 493 by Senator Ed Hernandez (D-West Covina) – Pharmacy practice.
• SB 563 by Senator Cathleen Galgiani (D-Stockton) – Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development: hospital construction.
• SB 679 by Senator Tom Berryhill (R-Modesto) – Licensees: reporting requirements.
• SB 814 by the Committee on Natural Resources and Water - Natural resources: administration.
• SB 821 by the Committee on Business, Professions and Economic Development – Healing arts.
• SB 823 by the Committee on Business, Professions and Economic Development – Professions and vocations: licensure.
Governor Brown also announced that he has vetoed the following bills.
• AB 374 by Assemblymember Donald P. Wagner (R-Irvine) – Eminent domain:
compensation: loss of goodwill. A veto message can be found here.
• SB 399 by Senator Roderick D. Wright (D-Los Angeles) – California Prompt Payment Act. A veto message can be found here.
Thursday, October 17, 2013
Friday, October 4, 2013
Part II: The Aggressor-Owner Duality and Restraints On Property
PART 2: MORAL LIMITS ON AGGRESSION
In the duality model, some aggression (broadly defined) is necessary, and therefore proper. A boundary between proper and improper aggression may be defined based on the difference between offense and defense. This is self-evidently a key principle for objectively distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable use of force or fraud. Condemning offensive aggression is at the heart of the non-aggression principle. Without such condemnation, any defense of oneself or others could be deemed morally improper; or conversely, any sort of violence or fraud could be deemed morally acceptable. It can sometimes be difficult to distinguish between offense and defense, but that is a different question.
Another important limiting principle is necessity. Under the principle of necessity, force is improper to the extent that it exceeds what is necessary for defense, under the circumstances. Again, precise line-drawing may be difficult particularly when the defender is enduring an attack, but necessity is nonetheless a useful moral principal. Without it, unnecessary violence and fraud is morally permissible. Necessity does not require that the defender always retreat, because, among other things retreat may entail immediately placing the defender at greater risk of harm. It should, however, prevent a defender from killing or unnecessarily injuring a clearly retreating or neutralized attacker, under almost all circumstances.
Proportionality can be seen as an aspect of necessity. Under proportionality, the degree of force employed should be proportional to the reasonably perceived attack or imminent threat. If, for example, a persistent person keeps tugging at my sleeve despite my warning to stop, escalating immediately to deadly force is not justified if no deadly threat can reasonably be perceived. Pushing the bothersome person away or slapping his hand might be a proportionate use of force, under these circumstance, even if a more peaceful approach would be more diplomatic. That which is disproportionate is unnecessary, and vice-versa.
Thus, two essential principles limiting principles are evident, summed up in the saying that aggression, to be proper, must be necessary for defense.
Under the defensive principle, improper aggression categorically excludes the use of offensive force. How can defense be distinguished from offense? By whether the action is directed towards preservation, or expansion. Defense cannot expand the defender or anyone whom the defender intends to benefit: not the defender's influence or access to resources, not the defender's control over territory or people, not the defender's money, not anything tending to increase the defender or somebody whom the defender intends to benefit. The best that defense can do is expend resources and take risks to defend against aggression, or restore what was wrongfully taken by aggression. If the application of force increases the defender or any of his intended beneficiaries beyond a reasonable point of restoration, it is not defense. It is offense. It is something that justifies an aggressive defense by the person on whom the force is perpetrated.
When libertarians express the non-aggression principle as forbidding initiation of force "for political or social goals," they are providing a more tangible but limited expression of the underlying principle. Political and social goals are merely limited examples of non-defensive purposes in the context of state action. They are important examples, nonetheless, because state-sponsored aggression is so often justified for some supposedly "greater good" of a particular social outcome, such as more even distribution of wealth or health care. Such supposed greater goods inevitably involve directing property, political power, or both to some favored person or class of persons, and away from the victims of the state-sponsored aggression. Because such aggression increases some to the detriment of others without any legitimate justification for being merely restorative, it is inherently offensive and therefore condemned by the non-aggression principle.
All defense requires an aggressor against whom the defense is made. By the same principle, aggression against innocent parties is always offensive. This principle limits the use of aggression to recover wrongfully taken property. When aggression is justified for restoration of stolen property, such justification does not extend beyond those who actually stole the property or knowingly received it as such. And the rule of necessity still applies to acts of recovery. The moral right to aggress to recover stolen property does not extend, for example, to the thief's descendants who unknowingly receive stolen property after the thief's estate is dissolved, or to bona-fide innocent acquirers of stolen property. To provide a more concrete example, suppose a car thief steals a car, sells it to a "fence" who after professionally changing the registration numbers and providing a clean title, in turn sells it to an innocent purchaser. The victim's right of restoration is preserved against the thief and the fence, but the victim has no moral right to steal the car back from the innocent purchaser or even to sue the innocent purchaser for restoration, assuming that the innocent purchaser is truly innocent. Such limits are necessary to prevent aggression against innocent people and perpetuation of endless cycles of violence based on claims of ancient wrongdoing. The children cannot be judged for the sins of their parents. That is not to say the children should not sometimes be expected to voluntarily redress the sins of their parents, or that all present claims to property must be respected. It is merely to say that restoration cannot justify aggression against innocent parties.
The one who strikes first should not automatically be considered the offender. It is sometimes claimed that "the best defense is a good offense." Whatever is commonly meant by this saying, if the use of force is necessary for defense, it is by definition not offense, but defense. For example, if a person who has made known his aggressive intention is preparing a weapon for an imminent attack, it may be merely defensive to aggressively neutralize the threat prior to the weapon being used, depending on whether or not it is reasonable for the defender to conclude she is under an imminent threat of attack. A proactive attack may be defensive or offensive, depending on the circumstances. If facing a pointed gun, the defender is not morally required to wait until the bullet is fired.
Great evils can and do come from an inability or unwillingness to draw reasonable distinctions between offense and defense. Such evils often deliberately arise through politically-motivated propaganda directed at a credulous populace. Persons who cannot or will not make reasonable distinctions between offense and defense are likely to commit an offense against their neighbors, without understanding their own moral depravity. And when their neighbors counter attack in justifiable defense, the original attackers are outraged, and defend passionately. And so they and their neighbors are at angry war with one another. This is evil, and unnecessary.
A person's erroneous belief that political constructs such as "defending freedom," or "preserving law and order" justify acts of violence beyond what is necessary for the person's own defense or the defense of the persons on whose behalf he acts, is no less culpable for the error. The soldiers or policemen who violate the non-aggression principle, or the politicians who direct their minions to do so, are not excused by virtue of their agency for the state. On the contrary, any person who claims the moral or legal authority to act as an agent of the exclusive powers claimed by the state should be held to a higher standard, by virtue of their claim to exclusive powers. In reality, due to the morally corrupting nature of power, the likelihood that aggression will be exercised morally is inversely related to the amount of power held by the aggressor. The more power, the less morality. Monopoly claims of state power inherently violate the non-aggression principle, at least by forbidding otherwise justifiable aggression by any agency that is not licensed by the state. The growth of state power inevitably results in massive disregard for any restraining moral precepts such as the non-aggression principle by state actors. Immense and incalculable suffering results.
Sometimes it is difficult for reasonable persons to discern between defense and offense or the limits of necessity, which may lead to mistaken acts of aggression. For example, unjustified force may be used by someone who is understandably mistaken about the underlying facts. Rational people should be capable of recognizing mistaken aggression, at some point, and break the cycle of violence by forgiving errors. Forgiveness should be possible when the original error is understandable under the circumstances. Whether or not the aggression is forgivable, once the aggression is finished, the persons harmed should receive just compensation, but not a right to retaliation. Vengeance and retaliation are simply aggression motivated by anger.
Much aggression is, of course, deliberate and offensive. Sometimes the aggressor aims to increase her interests beyond mere restoration. Such aggression is simply improper offense under the non-aggression principle, and should be condemned in all circumstances. Whatever the intent of the aggressor, the use of violence as a tool for grabbing a greater share of wealth is inherently counter-productive. Where violence is employed, the opportunities for wealth-building cooperation between the parties are forfeited.
Not all deliberate aggression is intended to increase the aggressor. Purely defensive violence, by definition, does not increase the aggressor. If intentional violence harms the person on whom it is inflicted without increasing the aggressor and without being clearly necessary for defense, it may be considered wanton. Wanton aggression is a purer form of evil, because it more efficiently destroys social order. Not only does it cause unnecessary harm without any intended benefit, but also provokes more intense outrage that is more likely to cause blow-back and perpetuate a cycle of violence. Carefully distinguishing between what is truly necessary for defense, and what is not, is an important moral duty. Mistakes are likely to provoke justifiable outrage, leading to a cycle of violence.
Under the duality model, unnecessary suffering is avoided by balancing the polarities of a duality. In Part I of this essay, aggression and property rights are conceived as opposite poles of a duality. Part II argues that under the non-aggression principle, certain limits on aggression are necessary to preserve social order. For example, to avoid perpetuating cycles of aggression and suffering, it is necessary to forbear from all aggression except what is necessary for defense, avoid mistaken acts of aggression by carefully distinguishing between defense and offense, forbear from restorative aggression against innocent parties, and forgive mistakes once just compensation is paid. These are essential aspects of the non-aggression principle.
Observance of the non-aggression principle, although necessary for lasting social order, is not sufficient. Part III will argue that limits on property rights are of complementary importance to the non-aggression principle for reducing suffering, and suggest some principles for discerning such limits.
In the duality model, some aggression (broadly defined) is necessary, and therefore proper. A boundary between proper and improper aggression may be defined based on the difference between offense and defense. This is self-evidently a key principle for objectively distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable use of force or fraud. Condemning offensive aggression is at the heart of the non-aggression principle. Without such condemnation, any defense of oneself or others could be deemed morally improper; or conversely, any sort of violence or fraud could be deemed morally acceptable. It can sometimes be difficult to distinguish between offense and defense, but that is a different question.
Another important limiting principle is necessity. Under the principle of necessity, force is improper to the extent that it exceeds what is necessary for defense, under the circumstances. Again, precise line-drawing may be difficult particularly when the defender is enduring an attack, but necessity is nonetheless a useful moral principal. Without it, unnecessary violence and fraud is morally permissible. Necessity does not require that the defender always retreat, because, among other things retreat may entail immediately placing the defender at greater risk of harm. It should, however, prevent a defender from killing or unnecessarily injuring a clearly retreating or neutralized attacker, under almost all circumstances.
Proportionality can be seen as an aspect of necessity. Under proportionality, the degree of force employed should be proportional to the reasonably perceived attack or imminent threat. If, for example, a persistent person keeps tugging at my sleeve despite my warning to stop, escalating immediately to deadly force is not justified if no deadly threat can reasonably be perceived. Pushing the bothersome person away or slapping his hand might be a proportionate use of force, under these circumstance, even if a more peaceful approach would be more diplomatic. That which is disproportionate is unnecessary, and vice-versa.
Thus, two essential principles limiting principles are evident, summed up in the saying that aggression, to be proper, must be necessary for defense.
Under the defensive principle, improper aggression categorically excludes the use of offensive force. How can defense be distinguished from offense? By whether the action is directed towards preservation, or expansion. Defense cannot expand the defender or anyone whom the defender intends to benefit: not the defender's influence or access to resources, not the defender's control over territory or people, not the defender's money, not anything tending to increase the defender or somebody whom the defender intends to benefit. The best that defense can do is expend resources and take risks to defend against aggression, or restore what was wrongfully taken by aggression. If the application of force increases the defender or any of his intended beneficiaries beyond a reasonable point of restoration, it is not defense. It is offense. It is something that justifies an aggressive defense by the person on whom the force is perpetrated.
When libertarians express the non-aggression principle as forbidding initiation of force "for political or social goals," they are providing a more tangible but limited expression of the underlying principle. Political and social goals are merely limited examples of non-defensive purposes in the context of state action. They are important examples, nonetheless, because state-sponsored aggression is so often justified for some supposedly "greater good" of a particular social outcome, such as more even distribution of wealth or health care. Such supposed greater goods inevitably involve directing property, political power, or both to some favored person or class of persons, and away from the victims of the state-sponsored aggression. Because such aggression increases some to the detriment of others without any legitimate justification for being merely restorative, it is inherently offensive and therefore condemned by the non-aggression principle.
All defense requires an aggressor against whom the defense is made. By the same principle, aggression against innocent parties is always offensive. This principle limits the use of aggression to recover wrongfully taken property. When aggression is justified for restoration of stolen property, such justification does not extend beyond those who actually stole the property or knowingly received it as such. And the rule of necessity still applies to acts of recovery. The moral right to aggress to recover stolen property does not extend, for example, to the thief's descendants who unknowingly receive stolen property after the thief's estate is dissolved, or to bona-fide innocent acquirers of stolen property. To provide a more concrete example, suppose a car thief steals a car, sells it to a "fence" who after professionally changing the registration numbers and providing a clean title, in turn sells it to an innocent purchaser. The victim's right of restoration is preserved against the thief and the fence, but the victim has no moral right to steal the car back from the innocent purchaser or even to sue the innocent purchaser for restoration, assuming that the innocent purchaser is truly innocent. Such limits are necessary to prevent aggression against innocent people and perpetuation of endless cycles of violence based on claims of ancient wrongdoing. The children cannot be judged for the sins of their parents. That is not to say the children should not sometimes be expected to voluntarily redress the sins of their parents, or that all present claims to property must be respected. It is merely to say that restoration cannot justify aggression against innocent parties.
The one who strikes first should not automatically be considered the offender. It is sometimes claimed that "the best defense is a good offense." Whatever is commonly meant by this saying, if the use of force is necessary for defense, it is by definition not offense, but defense. For example, if a person who has made known his aggressive intention is preparing a weapon for an imminent attack, it may be merely defensive to aggressively neutralize the threat prior to the weapon being used, depending on whether or not it is reasonable for the defender to conclude she is under an imminent threat of attack. A proactive attack may be defensive or offensive, depending on the circumstances. If facing a pointed gun, the defender is not morally required to wait until the bullet is fired.
Great evils can and do come from an inability or unwillingness to draw reasonable distinctions between offense and defense. Such evils often deliberately arise through politically-motivated propaganda directed at a credulous populace. Persons who cannot or will not make reasonable distinctions between offense and defense are likely to commit an offense against their neighbors, without understanding their own moral depravity. And when their neighbors counter attack in justifiable defense, the original attackers are outraged, and defend passionately. And so they and their neighbors are at angry war with one another. This is evil, and unnecessary.
A person's erroneous belief that political constructs such as "defending freedom," or "preserving law and order" justify acts of violence beyond what is necessary for the person's own defense or the defense of the persons on whose behalf he acts, is no less culpable for the error. The soldiers or policemen who violate the non-aggression principle, or the politicians who direct their minions to do so, are not excused by virtue of their agency for the state. On the contrary, any person who claims the moral or legal authority to act as an agent of the exclusive powers claimed by the state should be held to a higher standard, by virtue of their claim to exclusive powers. In reality, due to the morally corrupting nature of power, the likelihood that aggression will be exercised morally is inversely related to the amount of power held by the aggressor. The more power, the less morality. Monopoly claims of state power inherently violate the non-aggression principle, at least by forbidding otherwise justifiable aggression by any agency that is not licensed by the state. The growth of state power inevitably results in massive disregard for any restraining moral precepts such as the non-aggression principle by state actors. Immense and incalculable suffering results.
Sometimes it is difficult for reasonable persons to discern between defense and offense or the limits of necessity, which may lead to mistaken acts of aggression. For example, unjustified force may be used by someone who is understandably mistaken about the underlying facts. Rational people should be capable of recognizing mistaken aggression, at some point, and break the cycle of violence by forgiving errors. Forgiveness should be possible when the original error is understandable under the circumstances. Whether or not the aggression is forgivable, once the aggression is finished, the persons harmed should receive just compensation, but not a right to retaliation. Vengeance and retaliation are simply aggression motivated by anger.
Much aggression is, of course, deliberate and offensive. Sometimes the aggressor aims to increase her interests beyond mere restoration. Such aggression is simply improper offense under the non-aggression principle, and should be condemned in all circumstances. Whatever the intent of the aggressor, the use of violence as a tool for grabbing a greater share of wealth is inherently counter-productive. Where violence is employed, the opportunities for wealth-building cooperation between the parties are forfeited.
Not all deliberate aggression is intended to increase the aggressor. Purely defensive violence, by definition, does not increase the aggressor. If intentional violence harms the person on whom it is inflicted without increasing the aggressor and without being clearly necessary for defense, it may be considered wanton. Wanton aggression is a purer form of evil, because it more efficiently destroys social order. Not only does it cause unnecessary harm without any intended benefit, but also provokes more intense outrage that is more likely to cause blow-back and perpetuate a cycle of violence. Carefully distinguishing between what is truly necessary for defense, and what is not, is an important moral duty. Mistakes are likely to provoke justifiable outrage, leading to a cycle of violence.
Under the duality model, unnecessary suffering is avoided by balancing the polarities of a duality. In Part I of this essay, aggression and property rights are conceived as opposite poles of a duality. Part II argues that under the non-aggression principle, certain limits on aggression are necessary to preserve social order. For example, to avoid perpetuating cycles of aggression and suffering, it is necessary to forbear from all aggression except what is necessary for defense, avoid mistaken acts of aggression by carefully distinguishing between defense and offense, forbear from restorative aggression against innocent parties, and forgive mistakes once just compensation is paid. These are essential aspects of the non-aggression principle.
Observance of the non-aggression principle, although necessary for lasting social order, is not sufficient. Part III will argue that limits on property rights are of complementary importance to the non-aggression principle for reducing suffering, and suggest some principles for discerning such limits.
Tuesday, September 10, 2013
Open-Source Law: An Introduction
Open source works great for software development, why not also for development of laws? In open source software development, a self-organizing group of volunteer programmers develops an application cooperatively. This may include defining an application program interface through which independent programmers can extend the functionality of the core application by developing plug-in modules. The resulting application and plug-ins are typically distributed for free, or for a nominal fee. As the user base grows, more developers are attracted and extend the functionality of the program further. Although the developers receive little or no fees for their programming services, a large and growing user base creates demand for the developers’ expert services such as, for example, training, consulting, or simply using the software for various purposes. Thus, developers are incentivized to create useful software for free distribution.
A similar model might be used to build a database or “evolutionary canon” of laws for voluntary adoption by individuals. A set of individuals that adopts the same law is defined as a community; no law is considered applicable to a person until voluntarily adopted by her. In this way, dispersed communities of voluntaryists can form around alternative sets of laws published in the evolutionary canon, without any need for formal agreements or other pre-existing relationships between members of the community.
Creating law around which communities subsequently form might be referred to as a “law first” model, as opposed to a traditional “community first” model in which the communities first form and the law develops afterwards. While the “law first” and “community first” models can happily coexist, the “law first” model enjoys the advantage that laws cannot be imposed by an elite group of law makers. By definition, in a law first, open source model, a person may adopt any law that is publicly expressed and not inconsistent with the core ethical principles of voluntarism, and no law that is not personally and voluntarily adopted by the person to whom it is applied is considered valid. An elite can find no advantage in the law first model except what is achievable by non-coercive, honest persuasion.
Persons who cannot find a law to their liking in the evolutionary canon are free to write their own law and add it to the canon. Disputes between persons belonging to the same community are handled by the law of the community. Disputes between persons from different communities are handled by choosing or defining the applicable law according to a predefined “conflict of law” rule. The conflict of law rule may be universally applicable to all communities, or particular to two or more specific communities.
Conflict of law rules are an essential and potentially complex feature of voluntary law, deserving of more detailed treatment than can be provided in this brief introductory essay. A prototype universal conflict of law rule has recently been published at www.vlda.org, with commentary. A system of economically sophisticated voluntary laws, logically connected by conflict of law rules, may support development of complex and economically powerful, interlinked communities of voluntaryists.
Ethical laws are necessarily characterized by compliance with certain essential principles. Each school will ensure that the law it publishes complies with the stated ethical principles of the school. The Voluntary Law Development Association (www.vlda.org) adheres to the principles of non-aggression, equality under the law, and statelessness. “Non-aggression” means that the use of coercion or fraud, except to the extent reasonably necessary to protect one’s person or property, gives rise to an actionable claim. Equality under the law means that the definition of personhood and the outcome of any claim cannot be predicated on arbitrary personal attributes such as, for example, color of skin, sexual preference, gender, or genetic makeup. Statelessness means total independence from any institution that claims or exercises a monopoly over the provision, adjudication, or enforcement of law. Socially transformative and many-branched legal systems may grow out of this single ethical seed.
In a fundamental sense, statelessness is merely a specific aspect of the non-aggression principle. However, in a less fundamental sense statelessness means enforcing a strict separation from statist institutions, even in those instances where the statist rule at issue does not directly offend the non-aggression principle. Under the principle of statelessness, dispute resolution forums applying voluntary law will not hear or consider any claim or defense based on statist laws, any more than statist law courts would apply voluntary laws. Enforcement mechanisms would likewise be strictly separate. This separateness enforces a choice on claimants: enforce your claim against other voluntary law society members using the mechanisms afforded by voluntary law, or bring your claim in a statist court and forfeit your reputation in all voluntary law societies that embrace the stateless ethic.
These core ethical principles cannot be fundamentally contradicted without destroying the voluntary, globally applicable and radically transformative character of the law to be developed. However, reasonable differences of opinion may exist at the margins, for example, over the precise definitions of “person,” “property,” and other foundational concepts. It should be possible to reconcile laws based on variations in the core ethical principles using conflict of law rules. For example, a rule may specify that claims are generally limited to those possible under the law adopted by the defending party. Such a rule may ensure that each person can enforce his morally preferred law against members of the same community, without being subject to claims based on more onerous law held by members of other communities.
Many different “schools” or voluntary law development communities may form and publish systems of voluntary laws. Such schools will find it to their advantage to avoid being isolated from competing schools, and may cooperate to develop universities of alternative legal schools in competition to produce laws of superior elegance and utility, while working out conflict of law solutions for as many scenarios as can be imagined. At a minimum, to avoid isolation and resulting irrelevance, schools will want to harmonize the organization of their own legal offerings with others, so that users may customize their laws by selecting laws from different schools without worrying about the laws being in conflict with one another. Just about the only requirement that should be laid on individuals customizing their own laws, apart from reasonable compliance with core ethical principles, is that whatever law an individual adopts be clearly defined and free of self-contradictory statements. Individuals adopting a system of law that is self-contradictory should be held responsible for any resulting ambiguity.
In the law-first model, common-law notions of judge-made law do not exist. Judge-made law is nothing other than law imposed without consent, and is therefore invalid. That said, legal reasoning used to reach a decision based on a particular set of facts may be considered a persuasive but not controlling factor in subsequent decisions, depending on the reputation of the decision maker. Likewise, published amendments to the law are not effective for, or against, any person who has not specifically and personally adopted the amended law. These qualities suggest that voluntary law is likely to be considerably more stable than statist law, because each amendment splits the community. Voluntary law will not be adopted by large numbers of people until it is sufficiently mature to have developed claims, remedies and defenses at a level of specificity that a large number of users are comfortable with. Put another way, voluntary law may be expected to develop relatively rapidly (given adequate resources) with few adopters until it hits a “sweet spot” of generally-preferred ambiguity and elegance. After that point, the adoptive community swells rapidly and further development of the law may generally be limited to adjusting for seismic shifts in community circumstances or preferences.
The speed at which voluntary law can be developed and the power of the resulting law is entirely dependent on the quality of the human resources committed. Early in the development process, financial needs are trivial and easily met. Less easy to secure are the interest and participation of the greatest minds now working in the area of anarchist or libertarian social philosophy, law, and economics. The author is well aware of his own limited abilities, and is only promoting the VLDA because he could not find anyone else doing something similar. Will some of the notable libertarian social philosophers of our generation contribute any of their energies directly to this effort, or parallel efforts? Signs point to yes, but it is too early to know for sure. Whether or not any of the respected thought leaders will directly participate, the success of voluntary law development will depend mainly on the passion, dedication, and writing abilities of the young. It is their future livelihoods and prosperity that are most at stake. Whatever your age, if you have read this far and share any of the passion and vision expressed in this essay, consider this a call to action. Simply send an email to info@vlda.org with a little information about yourself and how you’d like to contribute, and I’ll be in touch. Or just provide your thoughtful comments at www.vlda.org, send in your own laws for posting there, or post your laws elsewhere and send us a link.
The VLDA and similar efforts needs legal writers (anyone capable of good legal writing, regardless of state certification), commentators, critics, website developers and administrators, promoters, translators, resource managers, and executive board members. The VLDA is not (as of now) actually an association, incorporated or unincorporated, of any kind. It has no income, does not accept monetary contributions, and maintains no roster of membership. The VLDA is not a service provider, and does not aspire to be. The VLDA aspires to be a grassroots, curated community of writers and reviewers, not unlike a wiki. If that can be achieved, greater things may follow.
Among the great things that may follow is the flourishing of various independent voluntary law service providers, servicing the needs of communities that form around voluntary laws. Such services may include, for example, hosts of dispute resolution services, investigators, jurors and judges of various types, record-keeping services and registries, enforcement services, reputation certification services, advocates, counselors, and other service providers not yet imagined. As high quality services are more dependent on expertise, ethics, efficiency and customer service than on great concentrations of tangible capital, small and nimble service providers may out-compete highly capitalized and vertically integrated companies. With luck and perseverance, a rich eco-system of competitive service providers may arise that, free of state restrictions, far surpasses the rather pitiful achievements of statist legal systems in bringing a higher degree of justice to human relations.
If stateless society is ever to triumph over the state, it will be via the development of superior economic power by distributed communities with sophisticated trading relationships and stable alternative legal systems, coupled with the inevitable decline of social institutions based on the coercive power of social elites. The evolutionary canon of voluntary law has the potential to negate social divisions, by accommodating a wide variety of non-sociopathic moral preferences, instead of imposing one moral preference on everyone. The resulting social unity minimizes waste and social disruption caused by political battles over the right to impose one moral preference on others, not to mention squabbling over plunder. Meanwhile, a market-driven level of specificity and sophistication of voluntary law should facilitate complex transactions between diverse communities, enabling high degrees of labor specialization. Coupled with disruptive technologies such as crypto-currency, crypto-identity, and other breakthroughs, networks of voluntary law societies operating under economically efficient principles for allocation of scarce resources should develop superior technologies capable of being secured against violent expropriation by states and their antiquated wealth-destroying institutions. Thus, individuals will be attracted to voluntary law societies to enjoy access to a quality of life, services, and technologies as these things become of increasingly poorer quality for the subjects of state. Once a certain tipping point is reached, the momentum towards statelessness may become unstoppable.
To the skeptics of liberty, such visions are merely impractical dreams of a far distant or unachievable world. Voluntary law development may therefore seem to be merely an academic exercise, albeit one hopefully directed to a practical and socially beneficial goal. Whatever the outcome of this exercise, it is nonetheless worthy of our energies; it is an experiment directed towards demonstrating the venerable truths that the pen is mightier than the sword, and just words can change the world.
A similar model might be used to build a database or “evolutionary canon” of laws for voluntary adoption by individuals. A set of individuals that adopts the same law is defined as a community; no law is considered applicable to a person until voluntarily adopted by her. In this way, dispersed communities of voluntaryists can form around alternative sets of laws published in the evolutionary canon, without any need for formal agreements or other pre-existing relationships between members of the community.
Creating law around which communities subsequently form might be referred to as a “law first” model, as opposed to a traditional “community first” model in which the communities first form and the law develops afterwards. While the “law first” and “community first” models can happily coexist, the “law first” model enjoys the advantage that laws cannot be imposed by an elite group of law makers. By definition, in a law first, open source model, a person may adopt any law that is publicly expressed and not inconsistent with the core ethical principles of voluntarism, and no law that is not personally and voluntarily adopted by the person to whom it is applied is considered valid. An elite can find no advantage in the law first model except what is achievable by non-coercive, honest persuasion.
Persons who cannot find a law to their liking in the evolutionary canon are free to write their own law and add it to the canon. Disputes between persons belonging to the same community are handled by the law of the community. Disputes between persons from different communities are handled by choosing or defining the applicable law according to a predefined “conflict of law” rule. The conflict of law rule may be universally applicable to all communities, or particular to two or more specific communities.
Conflict of law rules are an essential and potentially complex feature of voluntary law, deserving of more detailed treatment than can be provided in this brief introductory essay. A prototype universal conflict of law rule has recently been published at www.vlda.org, with commentary. A system of economically sophisticated voluntary laws, logically connected by conflict of law rules, may support development of complex and economically powerful, interlinked communities of voluntaryists.
Ethical laws are necessarily characterized by compliance with certain essential principles. Each school will ensure that the law it publishes complies with the stated ethical principles of the school. The Voluntary Law Development Association (www.vlda.org) adheres to the principles of non-aggression, equality under the law, and statelessness. “Non-aggression” means that the use of coercion or fraud, except to the extent reasonably necessary to protect one’s person or property, gives rise to an actionable claim. Equality under the law means that the definition of personhood and the outcome of any claim cannot be predicated on arbitrary personal attributes such as, for example, color of skin, sexual preference, gender, or genetic makeup. Statelessness means total independence from any institution that claims or exercises a monopoly over the provision, adjudication, or enforcement of law. Socially transformative and many-branched legal systems may grow out of this single ethical seed.
In a fundamental sense, statelessness is merely a specific aspect of the non-aggression principle. However, in a less fundamental sense statelessness means enforcing a strict separation from statist institutions, even in those instances where the statist rule at issue does not directly offend the non-aggression principle. Under the principle of statelessness, dispute resolution forums applying voluntary law will not hear or consider any claim or defense based on statist laws, any more than statist law courts would apply voluntary laws. Enforcement mechanisms would likewise be strictly separate. This separateness enforces a choice on claimants: enforce your claim against other voluntary law society members using the mechanisms afforded by voluntary law, or bring your claim in a statist court and forfeit your reputation in all voluntary law societies that embrace the stateless ethic.
These core ethical principles cannot be fundamentally contradicted without destroying the voluntary, globally applicable and radically transformative character of the law to be developed. However, reasonable differences of opinion may exist at the margins, for example, over the precise definitions of “person,” “property,” and other foundational concepts. It should be possible to reconcile laws based on variations in the core ethical principles using conflict of law rules. For example, a rule may specify that claims are generally limited to those possible under the law adopted by the defending party. Such a rule may ensure that each person can enforce his morally preferred law against members of the same community, without being subject to claims based on more onerous law held by members of other communities.
Many different “schools” or voluntary law development communities may form and publish systems of voluntary laws. Such schools will find it to their advantage to avoid being isolated from competing schools, and may cooperate to develop universities of alternative legal schools in competition to produce laws of superior elegance and utility, while working out conflict of law solutions for as many scenarios as can be imagined. At a minimum, to avoid isolation and resulting irrelevance, schools will want to harmonize the organization of their own legal offerings with others, so that users may customize their laws by selecting laws from different schools without worrying about the laws being in conflict with one another. Just about the only requirement that should be laid on individuals customizing their own laws, apart from reasonable compliance with core ethical principles, is that whatever law an individual adopts be clearly defined and free of self-contradictory statements. Individuals adopting a system of law that is self-contradictory should be held responsible for any resulting ambiguity.
In the law-first model, common-law notions of judge-made law do not exist. Judge-made law is nothing other than law imposed without consent, and is therefore invalid. That said, legal reasoning used to reach a decision based on a particular set of facts may be considered a persuasive but not controlling factor in subsequent decisions, depending on the reputation of the decision maker. Likewise, published amendments to the law are not effective for, or against, any person who has not specifically and personally adopted the amended law. These qualities suggest that voluntary law is likely to be considerably more stable than statist law, because each amendment splits the community. Voluntary law will not be adopted by large numbers of people until it is sufficiently mature to have developed claims, remedies and defenses at a level of specificity that a large number of users are comfortable with. Put another way, voluntary law may be expected to develop relatively rapidly (given adequate resources) with few adopters until it hits a “sweet spot” of generally-preferred ambiguity and elegance. After that point, the adoptive community swells rapidly and further development of the law may generally be limited to adjusting for seismic shifts in community circumstances or preferences.
The speed at which voluntary law can be developed and the power of the resulting law is entirely dependent on the quality of the human resources committed. Early in the development process, financial needs are trivial and easily met. Less easy to secure are the interest and participation of the greatest minds now working in the area of anarchist or libertarian social philosophy, law, and economics. The author is well aware of his own limited abilities, and is only promoting the VLDA because he could not find anyone else doing something similar. Will some of the notable libertarian social philosophers of our generation contribute any of their energies directly to this effort, or parallel efforts? Signs point to yes, but it is too early to know for sure. Whether or not any of the respected thought leaders will directly participate, the success of voluntary law development will depend mainly on the passion, dedication, and writing abilities of the young. It is their future livelihoods and prosperity that are most at stake. Whatever your age, if you have read this far and share any of the passion and vision expressed in this essay, consider this a call to action. Simply send an email to info@vlda.org with a little information about yourself and how you’d like to contribute, and I’ll be in touch. Or just provide your thoughtful comments at www.vlda.org, send in your own laws for posting there, or post your laws elsewhere and send us a link.
The VLDA and similar efforts needs legal writers (anyone capable of good legal writing, regardless of state certification), commentators, critics, website developers and administrators, promoters, translators, resource managers, and executive board members. The VLDA is not (as of now) actually an association, incorporated or unincorporated, of any kind. It has no income, does not accept monetary contributions, and maintains no roster of membership. The VLDA is not a service provider, and does not aspire to be. The VLDA aspires to be a grassroots, curated community of writers and reviewers, not unlike a wiki. If that can be achieved, greater things may follow.
Among the great things that may follow is the flourishing of various independent voluntary law service providers, servicing the needs of communities that form around voluntary laws. Such services may include, for example, hosts of dispute resolution services, investigators, jurors and judges of various types, record-keeping services and registries, enforcement services, reputation certification services, advocates, counselors, and other service providers not yet imagined. As high quality services are more dependent on expertise, ethics, efficiency and customer service than on great concentrations of tangible capital, small and nimble service providers may out-compete highly capitalized and vertically integrated companies. With luck and perseverance, a rich eco-system of competitive service providers may arise that, free of state restrictions, far surpasses the rather pitiful achievements of statist legal systems in bringing a higher degree of justice to human relations.
If stateless society is ever to triumph over the state, it will be via the development of superior economic power by distributed communities with sophisticated trading relationships and stable alternative legal systems, coupled with the inevitable decline of social institutions based on the coercive power of social elites. The evolutionary canon of voluntary law has the potential to negate social divisions, by accommodating a wide variety of non-sociopathic moral preferences, instead of imposing one moral preference on everyone. The resulting social unity minimizes waste and social disruption caused by political battles over the right to impose one moral preference on others, not to mention squabbling over plunder. Meanwhile, a market-driven level of specificity and sophistication of voluntary law should facilitate complex transactions between diverse communities, enabling high degrees of labor specialization. Coupled with disruptive technologies such as crypto-currency, crypto-identity, and other breakthroughs, networks of voluntary law societies operating under economically efficient principles for allocation of scarce resources should develop superior technologies capable of being secured against violent expropriation by states and their antiquated wealth-destroying institutions. Thus, individuals will be attracted to voluntary law societies to enjoy access to a quality of life, services, and technologies as these things become of increasingly poorer quality for the subjects of state. Once a certain tipping point is reached, the momentum towards statelessness may become unstoppable.
To the skeptics of liberty, such visions are merely impractical dreams of a far distant or unachievable world. Voluntary law development may therefore seem to be merely an academic exercise, albeit one hopefully directed to a practical and socially beneficial goal. Whatever the outcome of this exercise, it is nonetheless worthy of our energies; it is an experiment directed towards demonstrating the venerable truths that the pen is mightier than the sword, and just words can change the world.
Tuesday, July 30, 2013
Part I: The Aggressor-Owner Duality and Restraints On Property
PART 1: THE AGGRESSOR-OWNER DUALITY
The non-aggression principle is pretty well accepted by anarchists/voluntaryists of all stripes, on the right or the left. Let's just assume it's unassailable in certain circles. But there is much disagreement over property rights. To name just a few issues, should a society based on the non-aggression principle recognize public (collectively owned) property? Intangible (e.g., "intellectual") property? Voluntary indentured servitude? What are the limits of private property and how do property rights arise? These are difficult issues, and it's only right that so much controversy exists over them.
Moral precepts underlying the limits and sources of property rights beyond an individual's ownership of her own body suffer from a certain lack of universal acceptance. The homesteading and fruit of your own labor precepts are useful, but lacking in certain ways. For example, the homesteading precept is quite friendly to accrual of monarchies over vast territories, having really nothing to say about monopolization of resources by accumulation. Taken to its logical extreme, an absolute monarchy subverts the non-aggression principle by making everybody else a serf or criminal trespasser of the property rights held by the monarch. In addition, there can be disagreement about what it means to homestead. For its part, the fruit of one's own labor precept runs into difficult problems when the meaning of "fruit" and "labor" are examined closely. In complex societies with division of labor, the extent of the fruits of one's own labor is not so clear, for example. Furthermore, the precept fails when the labor is a form of aggression, or depends on conditions created by exercise of aggression in some way, or when property is not produced by labor.
What additional moral precepts might be applied to the origination, extent and enforcement of property rights without departing from the voluntaryist paradigm? The history of human societies includes cycles of oppression and prosperity arising out of a struggle between aggressors and producers or victims. Perhaps it is not so absurd to conceive of an Aggressor-Owner Duality in society as a sort of Yin-Yang balance, which when out of balance causes suffering. If we seek a society in which less human suffering occurs, perhaps thinking about ways to harmonize proper defensive use of aggression and ownership in a stable balance may provide useful moral insights into property rights.
For the purpose of this essay, aggression is defined as the application of coercion or deceit, without regard to whether the application is morally justified. Coercion includes force or the threat of force, and deceit includes theft or fraud. As used in this essay, property applies to anything about which a claim of ownership is made, regardless of whether the claim is morally justified. These may be broader than conventional definitions, so please pay attention.
There are at least two kinds of duality models, opposite pairs and complementary pairs. In an opposite duality, extinguishing one of the pair causes the other to predominate. The Light-Darkness Duality is an example. Extinguishing light causes darkness to dominate, and vice-versa. When either side of an opposite duality dominates (that is, a prior balance of the elements changes), the utility of the duality suffers. For example, too much light can impair sight just as too much darkness, at least until the instrument of vision adapts to the change. In a complementary duality, extinguishing one of the pair extinguishes the other. The Male-Female Duality is an example. Extinguishing the Female destroys the Male, and vice-versa. The predominance of one complement is by necessity unsustainable, and therefore temporary.
In the Aggressor-Owner duality, neither side of the duality can exist without the other; each motivates the other. The duality is therefore of a complementary type. This duality can exist in two opposite modes, in an enlightened mode and in an unenlightened (unbalanced) mode. In the unbalanced mode, it might be called the Oppressor-Victim duality. In the unbalanced duality, coercion (force and the threat of force), deceit (e.g., theft or fraud), or both are used by oppressors to plunder whatever can be taken from victims. In the enlightened mode, aggression is used only to defend justified property rights, and no unjustified claims of property are made.
The Aggressor-Owner Duality in the unbalanced mode can be regarded as a pathology of society, because it causes avoidable suffering. To cure the pathology, balance the polarities. The Aggressor must renounce and forsake improper aggression: coercion, theft and deceit for any unjustified reason. The Owner must not make any inappropriate claim of ownership. Both restraints are equally necessary for the duality to operate in an enlightened state.
When the unbalanced mode of the duality predominates, society as a whole is weakened, the creation of wealth is diminished, and suffering increases for most members of the society. Nonetheless the continuance of the society depends on the victims producing more than necessary to sustain their own existence, and permitting the oppressors to take the surplus by aggression. Conversely the oppressors must restrain themselves from taking more than what is surplus from the victims, or else suffer a diminution in the productive capacity of the victim class. In the unbalanced mode the victims are owned, for all practical purposes if not openly, as property by the aggressors. As such, owners are making property claims that are unjustified and socially deleterious. Even if the aggressor class restrains itself to stealing the surplus, production of wealth by the society is less than it could be. The aggressors are too busy aggressing to produce anything of value, and the victims are robbed of incentive to produce any surplus, except what must be done to avoid the lash, real or metaphorical.
Let's assume that the greatest good is obtained when a society is operating in an enlightened state. Most owners and most aggressors are better off; only a few may be worse off. A society reaches an enlightened state when a predominate majority of its members recognizes economically effective limits on aggression and on property rights. In Parts II and III of this series, I'll suggest some limits on aggression and property, respectively.
The non-aggression principle is pretty well accepted by anarchists/voluntaryists of all stripes, on the right or the left. Let's just assume it's unassailable in certain circles. But there is much disagreement over property rights. To name just a few issues, should a society based on the non-aggression principle recognize public (collectively owned) property? Intangible (e.g., "intellectual") property? Voluntary indentured servitude? What are the limits of private property and how do property rights arise? These are difficult issues, and it's only right that so much controversy exists over them.
Moral precepts underlying the limits and sources of property rights beyond an individual's ownership of her own body suffer from a certain lack of universal acceptance. The homesteading and fruit of your own labor precepts are useful, but lacking in certain ways. For example, the homesteading precept is quite friendly to accrual of monarchies over vast territories, having really nothing to say about monopolization of resources by accumulation. Taken to its logical extreme, an absolute monarchy subverts the non-aggression principle by making everybody else a serf or criminal trespasser of the property rights held by the monarch. In addition, there can be disagreement about what it means to homestead. For its part, the fruit of one's own labor precept runs into difficult problems when the meaning of "fruit" and "labor" are examined closely. In complex societies with division of labor, the extent of the fruits of one's own labor is not so clear, for example. Furthermore, the precept fails when the labor is a form of aggression, or depends on conditions created by exercise of aggression in some way, or when property is not produced by labor.
What additional moral precepts might be applied to the origination, extent and enforcement of property rights without departing from the voluntaryist paradigm? The history of human societies includes cycles of oppression and prosperity arising out of a struggle between aggressors and producers or victims. Perhaps it is not so absurd to conceive of an Aggressor-Owner Duality in society as a sort of Yin-Yang balance, which when out of balance causes suffering. If we seek a society in which less human suffering occurs, perhaps thinking about ways to harmonize proper defensive use of aggression and ownership in a stable balance may provide useful moral insights into property rights.
For the purpose of this essay, aggression is defined as the application of coercion or deceit, without regard to whether the application is morally justified. Coercion includes force or the threat of force, and deceit includes theft or fraud. As used in this essay, property applies to anything about which a claim of ownership is made, regardless of whether the claim is morally justified. These may be broader than conventional definitions, so please pay attention.
There are at least two kinds of duality models, opposite pairs and complementary pairs. In an opposite duality, extinguishing one of the pair causes the other to predominate. The Light-Darkness Duality is an example. Extinguishing light causes darkness to dominate, and vice-versa. When either side of an opposite duality dominates (that is, a prior balance of the elements changes), the utility of the duality suffers. For example, too much light can impair sight just as too much darkness, at least until the instrument of vision adapts to the change. In a complementary duality, extinguishing one of the pair extinguishes the other. The Male-Female Duality is an example. Extinguishing the Female destroys the Male, and vice-versa. The predominance of one complement is by necessity unsustainable, and therefore temporary.
In the Aggressor-Owner duality, neither side of the duality can exist without the other; each motivates the other. The duality is therefore of a complementary type. This duality can exist in two opposite modes, in an enlightened mode and in an unenlightened (unbalanced) mode. In the unbalanced mode, it might be called the Oppressor-Victim duality. In the unbalanced duality, coercion (force and the threat of force), deceit (e.g., theft or fraud), or both are used by oppressors to plunder whatever can be taken from victims. In the enlightened mode, aggression is used only to defend justified property rights, and no unjustified claims of property are made.
The Aggressor-Owner Duality in the unbalanced mode can be regarded as a pathology of society, because it causes avoidable suffering. To cure the pathology, balance the polarities. The Aggressor must renounce and forsake improper aggression: coercion, theft and deceit for any unjustified reason. The Owner must not make any inappropriate claim of ownership. Both restraints are equally necessary for the duality to operate in an enlightened state.
When the unbalanced mode of the duality predominates, society as a whole is weakened, the creation of wealth is diminished, and suffering increases for most members of the society. Nonetheless the continuance of the society depends on the victims producing more than necessary to sustain their own existence, and permitting the oppressors to take the surplus by aggression. Conversely the oppressors must restrain themselves from taking more than what is surplus from the victims, or else suffer a diminution in the productive capacity of the victim class. In the unbalanced mode the victims are owned, for all practical purposes if not openly, as property by the aggressors. As such, owners are making property claims that are unjustified and socially deleterious. Even if the aggressor class restrains itself to stealing the surplus, production of wealth by the society is less than it could be. The aggressors are too busy aggressing to produce anything of value, and the victims are robbed of incentive to produce any surplus, except what must be done to avoid the lash, real or metaphorical.
Let's assume that the greatest good is obtained when a society is operating in an enlightened state. Most owners and most aggressors are better off; only a few may be worse off. A society reaches an enlightened state when a predominate majority of its members recognizes economically effective limits on aggression and on property rights. In Parts II and III of this series, I'll suggest some limits on aggression and property, respectively.
On The Trial of Adam Kokesh
My sole qualification for this posting is as somebody who has listened to several of Mr. Kokesh's podcasts. Although I don't agree with all of his views on every topic, I agree with him on many things, and find him to be an intelligent and articulate advocate for his anarcho-capitalist views. He does not seem to me like an agent provocateur, based on his past record of civil disobedience and professed views. I am not a criminal lawyer and know nothing specifically about the laws under which he has been charged, or criminal procedure in D.C.
But hey -- this is only a blog! So my lack of qualifications should not prevent me from expressing an opinion -- or several opinions!
To make charges involving a loaded firearm in D.C. stick in the digital video editing age, the prosecution will need a witness to the video being shot in D.C.; or more exactly, to Kokesh's alleged conduct vis-a-vis the alleged illegal weapon within D.C.'s borders. It would therefore not be surprising to discover that the prosecution has gotten to somebody in the Kokesh entourage (e.g., the camera person) by threatening to bring accessory charges of some kind, in exchange for eyewitness testimony of Kokesh in D.C when the video was made and his related actions, assuming the video was actually made there and not in front of a green screen in Virginia.
If such hypothetical witness would refuse to testify it would be very difficult for the prosecution to make any kind of case against Kokesh. Unfortunately, refusing to cooperate with prosecutors threatening lengthy prison sentences and onerous fines takes courage that few people have when it matters.
The obviously politically-motivated prosecution of Kokesh is an outrageous travesty of justice. That said, Kokesh's angry video or imprisonment are unlikely to win many converts to his anarcho-capitalist views, and may well hurt his cause. Check out the comments on a MSM site reporting on this story, if you doubt. About 90% of comments label Kokesh a dangerous nut. Such are the prejudices and warped moral senses of all too many. Civil disobedience involving the right to keep and bear arms unfortunately plays into the stereotype of the dangerous and angry anarchist, with which the masses are imprinted by virtue of government-run indoctrination centers and mainstream media outlets.
No establishment power will tolerate open rebellion so long as it has the power to stop it. No surprise there. Very few or none of the liberty/Ron Paul crowd are interested in open rebellion against D.C.'s unconstitutional gun laws -- so imprisoning Kokesh will frighten no one except those very few if any who would emulate him in civilly disobeying anti-2nd amendment laws particularly. It will, however, keep Kokesh locked away and out of public discourse, if the prosecution succeeds. Not good.
There is of course plenty of open and secret rebellion in this country and elsewhere that the political establishment is essentially powerless to stop. Such chinks in the dragon's armor may be more productive places to expand personal freedoms, instead of charging the dragon head on. Mr. Kokesh is brave to do so, but no one should be surprised if more than his hair is singed.
Those wishing to donate to Adam's defense can do so here.
But hey -- this is only a blog! So my lack of qualifications should not prevent me from expressing an opinion -- or several opinions!
To make charges involving a loaded firearm in D.C. stick in the digital video editing age, the prosecution will need a witness to the video being shot in D.C.; or more exactly, to Kokesh's alleged conduct vis-a-vis the alleged illegal weapon within D.C.'s borders. It would therefore not be surprising to discover that the prosecution has gotten to somebody in the Kokesh entourage (e.g., the camera person) by threatening to bring accessory charges of some kind, in exchange for eyewitness testimony of Kokesh in D.C when the video was made and his related actions, assuming the video was actually made there and not in front of a green screen in Virginia.
If such hypothetical witness would refuse to testify it would be very difficult for the prosecution to make any kind of case against Kokesh. Unfortunately, refusing to cooperate with prosecutors threatening lengthy prison sentences and onerous fines takes courage that few people have when it matters.
The obviously politically-motivated prosecution of Kokesh is an outrageous travesty of justice. That said, Kokesh's angry video or imprisonment are unlikely to win many converts to his anarcho-capitalist views, and may well hurt his cause. Check out the comments on a MSM site reporting on this story, if you doubt. About 90% of comments label Kokesh a dangerous nut. Such are the prejudices and warped moral senses of all too many. Civil disobedience involving the right to keep and bear arms unfortunately plays into the stereotype of the dangerous and angry anarchist, with which the masses are imprinted by virtue of government-run indoctrination centers and mainstream media outlets.
No establishment power will tolerate open rebellion so long as it has the power to stop it. No surprise there. Very few or none of the liberty/Ron Paul crowd are interested in open rebellion against D.C.'s unconstitutional gun laws -- so imprisoning Kokesh will frighten no one except those very few if any who would emulate him in civilly disobeying anti-2nd amendment laws particularly. It will, however, keep Kokesh locked away and out of public discourse, if the prosecution succeeds. Not good.
There is of course plenty of open and secret rebellion in this country and elsewhere that the political establishment is essentially powerless to stop. Such chinks in the dragon's armor may be more productive places to expand personal freedoms, instead of charging the dragon head on. Mr. Kokesh is brave to do so, but no one should be surprised if more than his hair is singed.
Those wishing to donate to Adam's defense can do so here.
Sunday, June 23, 2013
Debunking the Conundrums of the Non-Aggression Principle
At http://www.libertarianism.org/blog/lifes-more-complicated-non-aggression-principle
Bruce Lindsey of the Cato Institute wrote:
Really, Mr. Lindsey? People who call themselves "libertarians" support compulsory vaccination, and government spending to "alleviate poverty" or "promote education"? These labels are getting confusing. I thought people who supported things like violent taxation for wealth distribution and collective, violent control over healthcare called themselves "progressives" or "socialists." So are you advocating that progressives and socialists start calling themselves libertarians? Or are you calling for libertarians to abandon the NAP in favor of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need?" Or are you just disparaging the NAP as "absurd and repugnant," without any rational analysis?
Sadly Mr. Lindsey rejects the NAP as a foundational principle, and merely advocates for the statist status quo. In view of his statements on compulsory vaccination (violence) and taxation (theft), he favors the initiation of force against others so long as some notion of "collective good" is used to excuse the aggression. In his own words: "NAP fundamentalism is utterly unworkable as a basis for libertarian thought." If justifying theft and violence based on politically determined notions of the collective good is what his brand of "libertarianism" entails, count me out. The NAP remains a very useful and fundamental ethical principle for informing libertarian thought.
So what is the NAP, exactly? The Ludwig von Mises Institute provides a useful and precise definition:
Let's examine this ethical principle in view of the alleged "absurd or repugnant implications" of the NAP listed by Mr. Lindsay.
"In a mere exchange of promises there could be no NAP-consistent remedy in the event of a breach." Even statist courts generally do not enforce mere exchanges of promises if unsupported by consideration or not memorialized in writing. If all mere exchanges of promises were legally enforceable, it's not hard to imagine all sorts of absurd or repugnant outcomes. So let us suppose Mr. Lindsey is referring to commercial contracts, such as those in which one party promises to delivers a product or service by some future date, and the other party promises to pay after receiving the product or service. Assuming the parties have memorialized their exchange of promises in writing, a contract has been formed in which the terms of enforcement are either expressly written out or implied by the legal system under which the contract is made. Such terms of enforcement may (but do not necessarily) include permitting the initiation of force against a party breaching the contract. Thus, if force is properly initiated against a breaching party to a contract, there is no violation of the NAP, because the breaching party has already agreed to the initiation of force by executing the contract. That's the essence of contracts, which are absolutely not forbidden by the NAP. Whether or not the contract is based on an exchange of promises is utterly irrelevant to application of the NAP. Causing someone to execute a contract by coercion or fraud is forbidden by the NAP, but it is not otherwise concerned with how contracts are formed.
"Harboring a fugitive would not be a crime." Helping a murderer or other such criminal evade justice would certainly be actionable without violating the NAP, even if the harboring is done only after the crime is committed. A violent criminal, thief or fraudster owes recompense to his victim for the harm cause and possibly also punitive damages; hence the victim or the victim's delegate have a personal property interest in bringing the criminal to justice. A person knowingly and intentionally interfering with that property interest has initiated an improper act of aggression, and thus may be held liable for the harboring. On the other hand, if there is no victim, there is no crime, and harboring is by definition impossible.
"Neither would blackmail." It depends what is meant by "blackmail" and the circumstances under which it occurs. A threat to reveal a true fact about someone unless some compensation or behavior is forthcoming may, or may not implicate the NAP. If proof of the unsavory fact has been obtained by entrapment (i.e., fraud) or coercion (including the theft of confidential information), then the fraud or coercion is actionable under the NAP. If the unsavory fact is provable merely because a bad actor has been caught in the act, why should it be repugnant for the NAP to fail to protect the bad actor? On the other hand, if a criminal is caught in the act by somebody other than the victim (for example, if Rubie blackmails Bob, who she caught stealing Jose's chickens), then the blackmailer is aggressing on the victim's property interest by offering to cover up the evidence of the crime in exchange for some payment. In such circumstances, it would not violate the NAP to hold both the criminal responsible for his crimes, and the blackmailer responsible for her interference with the victim's property interest.
"Neither would even the most heinous cruelty to animals." Libertarians, when will you stop beating your animals??? All the libertarians I know are compassionate, gentle people who, if they keep animals, are as kind if not kinder to their animals than the general population. And I've never met or heard of a libertarian who embraced the NAP yet advocated for the repeal of all laws against cruelty to animals. The NAP is flexible enough to be expanded beyond the purely human sphere to include things such as animal rights; for example liability for cruelty to animals is perfectly consistent with the NAP when applied in a social context that recognizes animals as something more than unthinking and unfeeling objects. Put another way, while the NAP is concerned with force against persons or property, it does not define what a "person" or "property" is. In a social context where animals have certain rights, animals might enjoy an intermediate sort of protection in which the NAP could not be used as a shield to protect those who violate the recognized rights of animals from the legal consequences of their contemptible cruelties. This has nothing to do with the NAP itself; animal rights arise out of the social context in which the NAP is applied. Similarly, many ethical rules are silent on animal cruelty - for example the Golden Rule ("Do unto others as you would have them do unto you") says nothing about cruelty to animals. Hardly a reason to reject the Golden Rule as a fundamental ethical principle.
"There could be no bankruptcy law that extinguishes debts." This statement assumes that the NAP defines all debts as absolute property rights that cannot be taken away under any circumstance. But as with animal rights, it fails to recognize that the NAP does not define what "property" is. Thus, in a social context that recognizes the virtues and legality of a discharge of debt under certain limited circumstance, it would not violate the NAP to refuse to allow a creditor to enforce a debt when those limited circumstances applied.
"Tort liability for corporations would either be unlimited or nonexistent (in which case only the individual employees responsible would be liable)." If any influential libertarians advocate excusing corporations from tort liability, on the basis of the NAP or otherwise, I have never run across them. Some libertarians believe that limited corporate liability creates economic moral hazard and thus, should not be tolerated. On that basis, many libertarians support extending corporate liability to the persons individually responsible for corporate harms, in limited circumstances or more generally. Mr. Lindsey's statement is just another baseless disparagement of what libertarians supposedly believe, and is entirely unrelated to the NAP besides. The NAP says nothing about corporate tort liability, and certainly would not forbid it.
"There could be no compulsory vaccines during epidemics." After a parade of false horribles, at last we arrive at the first true statement in Mr. Lindsey's list. However, it is neither absurd nor repugnant for the NAP to forbid the compulsory injection of substances into a competent adult who objects to such invasions of her body. Nor is there any reason why this should be a problem. If there ever occurs a deathly epidemic at a time when an effective and risk-free vaccine is widely available, those very few people suffering from irrational fears of all vaccines will suffer the gravest consequences, for which they will be solely and individually responsible. And so be it. Meanwhile, since the vaccine is so effective, those who receive it will be placed at no risk at all by the refusal of the irrational minority. So why is this a problem?
"The NAP proscribes taxation as well as any government spending to alleviate poverty, promote education, or do anything else besides protecting persons and property." The second true statement in Mr. Lindsey's list. Yes, libertarians, after allegedly beating their animals, harboring fugitives, spreading disease, casting debtors in prison, breaking contracts without penalties, shielding evil corporations from tort liability, and blackmailing with glee, believe in limited government. Many even believe that the existence of government -- defined as a monopoly on the initiation of aggression in a defined jurisdiction -- is a moral evil. Long may it ever be so.
The NAP is a fundamental touchstone for libertarian thought, but is not the only principle informing libertarian thinking on sociopolitical matters. Definitions of property, trespass, harm, conditions necessary for voluntary consent or guardianship, what constitutes creation of unreasonable risk of harm and many other principles are also clearly important. The NAP can't work in a vacuum; its essence is a balancing of the freedom of action of the individual against the right of others to enjoy equivalent freedoms. Other principles are needed to define what freedom of action and curtailment of freedom consist of in different circumstances. Libertarians will probably always have some differences amongst themselves about exactly how the NAP should be applied in different circumstances, but those who advocate abandoning the NAP as a fundamental touchstone should be ashamed to call themselves libertarians.
Bruce Lindsey of the Cato Institute wrote:
In other cases, there is no escape hatch of ambiguity to rescue the NAP from absurd or repugnant implications. It seems quite clear that there could no legal enforcement of contracts in the way we are familiar with: restitution could be ordered when actual money has changed hands, but in a mere exchange of promises there could be no NAP-consistent remedy in the event of a breach. Harboring a fugitive would not be a crime. Neither would blackmail. Neither would even the most heinous cruelty to animals. There could be no bankruptcy law that extinguishes debts. Tort liability for corporations would either be unlimited or nonexistent (in which case only the individual employees responsible would be liable). There could be no compulsory vaccines during epidemics. And of course, the NAP proscribes taxation as well as any government spending to alleviate poverty, promote education, or do anything else besides protecting persons and property.
Really, Mr. Lindsey? People who call themselves "libertarians" support compulsory vaccination, and government spending to "alleviate poverty" or "promote education"? These labels are getting confusing. I thought people who supported things like violent taxation for wealth distribution and collective, violent control over healthcare called themselves "progressives" or "socialists." So are you advocating that progressives and socialists start calling themselves libertarians? Or are you calling for libertarians to abandon the NAP in favor of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need?" Or are you just disparaging the NAP as "absurd and repugnant," without any rational analysis?
Sadly Mr. Lindsey rejects the NAP as a foundational principle, and merely advocates for the statist status quo. In view of his statements on compulsory vaccination (violence) and taxation (theft), he favors the initiation of force against others so long as some notion of "collective good" is used to excuse the aggression. In his own words: "NAP fundamentalism is utterly unworkable as a basis for libertarian thought." If justifying theft and violence based on politically determined notions of the collective good is what his brand of "libertarianism" entails, count me out. The NAP remains a very useful and fundamental ethical principle for informing libertarian thought.
So what is the NAP, exactly? The Ludwig von Mises Institute provides a useful and precise definition:
The non-aggression principle (also called the non-aggression axiom, or the anti-coercion or zero aggression principle or non-initiation of force) is an ethical stance which asserts that "aggression" is inherently illegitimate. "Aggression" is defined as the "initiation" of physical force against persons or property, the threat of such, or fraud upon persons or their property. In contrast to pacifism, the non-aggression principle does not preclude violent self-defense. The principle is a deontological (or rule-based) ethical stance.Http://wiki.mises.org/wiki/Principle_of_non-aggression (June 22, 2013).
Let's examine this ethical principle in view of the alleged "absurd or repugnant implications" of the NAP listed by Mr. Lindsay.
"In a mere exchange of promises there could be no NAP-consistent remedy in the event of a breach." Even statist courts generally do not enforce mere exchanges of promises if unsupported by consideration or not memorialized in writing. If all mere exchanges of promises were legally enforceable, it's not hard to imagine all sorts of absurd or repugnant outcomes. So let us suppose Mr. Lindsey is referring to commercial contracts, such as those in which one party promises to delivers a product or service by some future date, and the other party promises to pay after receiving the product or service. Assuming the parties have memorialized their exchange of promises in writing, a contract has been formed in which the terms of enforcement are either expressly written out or implied by the legal system under which the contract is made. Such terms of enforcement may (but do not necessarily) include permitting the initiation of force against a party breaching the contract. Thus, if force is properly initiated against a breaching party to a contract, there is no violation of the NAP, because the breaching party has already agreed to the initiation of force by executing the contract. That's the essence of contracts, which are absolutely not forbidden by the NAP. Whether or not the contract is based on an exchange of promises is utterly irrelevant to application of the NAP. Causing someone to execute a contract by coercion or fraud is forbidden by the NAP, but it is not otherwise concerned with how contracts are formed.
"Harboring a fugitive would not be a crime." Helping a murderer or other such criminal evade justice would certainly be actionable without violating the NAP, even if the harboring is done only after the crime is committed. A violent criminal, thief or fraudster owes recompense to his victim for the harm cause and possibly also punitive damages; hence the victim or the victim's delegate have a personal property interest in bringing the criminal to justice. A person knowingly and intentionally interfering with that property interest has initiated an improper act of aggression, and thus may be held liable for the harboring. On the other hand, if there is no victim, there is no crime, and harboring is by definition impossible.
"Neither would blackmail." It depends what is meant by "blackmail" and the circumstances under which it occurs. A threat to reveal a true fact about someone unless some compensation or behavior is forthcoming may, or may not implicate the NAP. If proof of the unsavory fact has been obtained by entrapment (i.e., fraud) or coercion (including the theft of confidential information), then the fraud or coercion is actionable under the NAP. If the unsavory fact is provable merely because a bad actor has been caught in the act, why should it be repugnant for the NAP to fail to protect the bad actor? On the other hand, if a criminal is caught in the act by somebody other than the victim (for example, if Rubie blackmails Bob, who she caught stealing Jose's chickens), then the blackmailer is aggressing on the victim's property interest by offering to cover up the evidence of the crime in exchange for some payment. In such circumstances, it would not violate the NAP to hold both the criminal responsible for his crimes, and the blackmailer responsible for her interference with the victim's property interest.
"Neither would even the most heinous cruelty to animals." Libertarians, when will you stop beating your animals??? All the libertarians I know are compassionate, gentle people who, if they keep animals, are as kind if not kinder to their animals than the general population. And I've never met or heard of a libertarian who embraced the NAP yet advocated for the repeal of all laws against cruelty to animals. The NAP is flexible enough to be expanded beyond the purely human sphere to include things such as animal rights; for example liability for cruelty to animals is perfectly consistent with the NAP when applied in a social context that recognizes animals as something more than unthinking and unfeeling objects. Put another way, while the NAP is concerned with force against persons or property, it does not define what a "person" or "property" is. In a social context where animals have certain rights, animals might enjoy an intermediate sort of protection in which the NAP could not be used as a shield to protect those who violate the recognized rights of animals from the legal consequences of their contemptible cruelties. This has nothing to do with the NAP itself; animal rights arise out of the social context in which the NAP is applied. Similarly, many ethical rules are silent on animal cruelty - for example the Golden Rule ("Do unto others as you would have them do unto you") says nothing about cruelty to animals. Hardly a reason to reject the Golden Rule as a fundamental ethical principle.
"There could be no bankruptcy law that extinguishes debts." This statement assumes that the NAP defines all debts as absolute property rights that cannot be taken away under any circumstance. But as with animal rights, it fails to recognize that the NAP does not define what "property" is. Thus, in a social context that recognizes the virtues and legality of a discharge of debt under certain limited circumstance, it would not violate the NAP to refuse to allow a creditor to enforce a debt when those limited circumstances applied.
"Tort liability for corporations would either be unlimited or nonexistent (in which case only the individual employees responsible would be liable)." If any influential libertarians advocate excusing corporations from tort liability, on the basis of the NAP or otherwise, I have never run across them. Some libertarians believe that limited corporate liability creates economic moral hazard and thus, should not be tolerated. On that basis, many libertarians support extending corporate liability to the persons individually responsible for corporate harms, in limited circumstances or more generally. Mr. Lindsey's statement is just another baseless disparagement of what libertarians supposedly believe, and is entirely unrelated to the NAP besides. The NAP says nothing about corporate tort liability, and certainly would not forbid it.
"There could be no compulsory vaccines during epidemics." After a parade of false horribles, at last we arrive at the first true statement in Mr. Lindsey's list. However, it is neither absurd nor repugnant for the NAP to forbid the compulsory injection of substances into a competent adult who objects to such invasions of her body. Nor is there any reason why this should be a problem. If there ever occurs a deathly epidemic at a time when an effective and risk-free vaccine is widely available, those very few people suffering from irrational fears of all vaccines will suffer the gravest consequences, for which they will be solely and individually responsible. And so be it. Meanwhile, since the vaccine is so effective, those who receive it will be placed at no risk at all by the refusal of the irrational minority. So why is this a problem?
"The NAP proscribes taxation as well as any government spending to alleviate poverty, promote education, or do anything else besides protecting persons and property." The second true statement in Mr. Lindsey's list. Yes, libertarians, after allegedly beating their animals, harboring fugitives, spreading disease, casting debtors in prison, breaking contracts without penalties, shielding evil corporations from tort liability, and blackmailing with glee, believe in limited government. Many even believe that the existence of government -- defined as a monopoly on the initiation of aggression in a defined jurisdiction -- is a moral evil. Long may it ever be so.
The NAP is a fundamental touchstone for libertarian thought, but is not the only principle informing libertarian thinking on sociopolitical matters. Definitions of property, trespass, harm, conditions necessary for voluntary consent or guardianship, what constitutes creation of unreasonable risk of harm and many other principles are also clearly important. The NAP can't work in a vacuum; its essence is a balancing of the freedom of action of the individual against the right of others to enjoy equivalent freedoms. Other principles are needed to define what freedom of action and curtailment of freedom consist of in different circumstances. Libertarians will probably always have some differences amongst themselves about exactly how the NAP should be applied in different circumstances, but those who advocate abandoning the NAP as a fundamental touchstone should be ashamed to call themselves libertarians.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)